The Class Appeal
Adam S. Zimmerman†
For a wide variety of claims against the government, the federal courthouse
doors are closed to all but those brought by powerful, organized interests. This is
because hundreds of laws—colloquially known as “channeling statutes”—require
disaffected groups to contest government bodies directly in appellate courts that hear
cases individually. In theory, these laws promise quick, consistent, and authoritative
legal decisions in appellate courts. In fact, without class actions, government bodies
avoid judicial review by selectively avoiding claims brought by some of the most vulnerable people in the administrative state—from veterans and immigrants to coal
miners, laborers, and the disabled.
This Article proposes a novel solution: courts of appeals should hear class actions themselves. In so doing, courts high in the judicial hierarchy would continue
to authoritatively decide important legal questions involving government institutions while ensuring groups of similar, unrepresented parties finally get their day in
court. While appellate class actions might sound like a strange procedural innovation, appellate courts already have the power to do this. Relying on the All Writs Act,
appellate courts long ago created ad hoc procedures modeled after class actions to
respond to systemic government harm.
This Article is the first to examine nascent experiments with appellate class
actions. It shows that, contrary to popular belief, appellate courts can hear class
actions, and it explains why they should do so. In cases challenging systemic abuse,
this power has become vital not only to level the playing field between the government and the governed but also to protect courts’ core functions in our separation of
powers—to hear claims, interpret law, and grant meaningful relief. Without classwide judgments in such cases, courts risk ceding power to the executive branch to
decide for itself when judicial decisions limit its own unlawful policies.
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INTRODUCTION
For a wide variety of claims against the government, the federal courthouse doors are closed. This is because hundreds of
laws—colloquially known as “channeling statutes”—require that
disaffected groups contest government bodies directly in
appellate courts that traditionally hear cases one at a time.1 This
system may adequately serve private organizations that have the
resources, experts, and counsel to challenge the government in
the nation’s second-highest courts. But for diffuse groups of poor
and unrepresented claimants, appellate courts lack critical tools
that class actions offer to say what the law is.2 Consider the following examples:
1
See Appendix A (Federal Statutes Channeling Review Directly into Appellate
Courts) [hereinafter “Appendix A”]. I owe a great debt to the Administrative Conference
of the United States (ACUS), from which I obtained the material for the 183 laws included
in this appendix. ACUS’s Sourcebook of all Federal Judicial Review Statutes was published in June 2022. Cataloging every federal review statute, it identifies over six hundred
laws designating different federal district courts, appellate courts, and other specialized
courts that review government actions. See JONATHAN R. SIEGEL, THE ACUS SOURCEBOOK
OF FED. JUD. REV. STATUTES (2022).
2
Reformers specifically designed the modern class action to facilitate judicial review of unlawful government action for this reason. See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble:
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For decades, veteran groups challenged benefit programs
beset by systemic, multiyear delays.3 But because veterans
had to file their cases in an appellate court that did not
hear class actions, the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) persistently avoided judicial review. The government
often strategically resolved petitions just before their
hearing dates, ignoring the systemic problems alleged and
forcing courts to dismiss cases as moot.4
After sixty thousand children crossed the U.S.-Mexico border in fiscal year 2014, attorneys brought a class action in
federal district court against the Department of Justice
arguing that the children should receive counsel in
immigration hearings.5 But because a law transferred
those immigration cases directly to federal appellate
courts without class certification,6 each child had to go it
alone in adversarial immigration proceedings before any
court heard their same right-to-counsel claim. When those
children could not individually navigate what the court itself called a “labyrinthine maze” of immigration rules,7 the
government deported thousands of them without taking

Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV.
657, 702 (2011) (“The only recorded conversations to have shaped [Rule 23(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] involved concerns about desegregation litigation.”); see
also Arthur R. Miller, The American Class Action: From Birth to Maturity, 19
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5 (2018) (noting that the drafters of Rule 23 thought that
effective class action procedure was critical for achieving school desegregation and
pursuing other civil rights causes).
3
See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1026 (9th Cir.
2012) (arguing that multiyear veteran-benefit delays violate due process).
4
Appellate judges in the Federal Circuit and the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims have repeatedly criticized this practice. See Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (collecting cases and observing that “[c]ase law is replete with such examples”); see also Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215 (2012) (Lance, J., dissenting) (noting that a Westlaw search “produces 54 results” for “dismissals [that] were almost exclusively based upon mootness because the Secretary responded to the petition [for
extraordinary relief] by remedying the problem without requiring a Court order”).
5
J.E.F.M. v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1029–30, 1039 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing WILLIAM
KANDEL, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2016)); see also Liz Robbins,
Immigration Crisis Shifts from Border to Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2015),
https://perma.cc/MXQ9-ARNP.
6
See Aguilar v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Div. of Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d
1, 9 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing the “vise-like” grip appellate courts had on virtually all
claims tied to immigration removal proceedings); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313 &
n.37 (2001) (explaining the law’s purpose “to consolidate ‘judicial review’ of immigration
proceedings into one action in the court of appeals”); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and
the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1984–85 (2000).
7
J.E.F.M., 837 F.3d at 1040 (McKeown, J., concurring).
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steps to preserve their rights on appeal.8 Many children
simply disappeared. The court would never again hear the
children’s constitutional claims.9
• When the Treasury Department fired a group of men for
failing to register for the draft, the group filed a class action in district court under the Equal Protection Clause.10
The Supreme Court rejected their complaint, ruling that
they had to file their claims directly in an appellate court.11
The Court acknowledged the problems appellate courts
would face resolving systemic challenges based on a lone
petitioner’s government record.12 But the Court found that
a plain reading of the statute required the group to individually file their claims in appellate court anyway.13
Had these cases proceeded as class actions, the result would
have been decidedly different. The government could not have selectively picked off systemic claims pursued on behalf of a class of
veterans.14 Class counsel could have identified unrepresented
children and ensured that they received the benefits of the court’s
decisions.15 The court could have relied on a common record to review similar legal claims of gender discrimination.16 Nevertheless, in each case, courts felt obligated to dismiss such claims,

8
EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILD (UAC) IN ABSENTIA
REMOVAL ORDERS (2022) (showing that the government deported thousands of unrepresented children in absentia).
9
C.J.L.G. v. Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring) (criticizing
courts’ failure to hear claims because “[s]uch cases are extremely difficult to bring” and
noting that “thousands of unrepresented children have been ordered removed”).
10 Elgin v. United States, 697 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189 (D. Mass. 2010).
11 Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 23 (2012).
12 Id. at 19 (suggesting that the court could take judicial notice of facts for an Equal
Protection Claim or, if not possible, remand to the agency for additional fact-finding).
13 Id. at 11–12.
14 Compare Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (holding that the government cannot moot claims by class members by only resolving the lead plaintiff’s claim),
with Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (noting that the government can
moot such claims in the absence of a class action).
15 Cf. Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (“ICE”), 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1139–
45 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (finding circumstances warranted a class-wide injunction because the
government was “not affirmatively reuniting parents” with children).
16 Compare Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 (1977)
(finding that class-wide evidence of pattern-and-practice can be used in class actions to
shift the burden of proof to the employer), with Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuela SA,
266 F.3d 343, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2001) (limiting evidence of pattern-and-practice claims outside of class actions), and Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106–08 (10th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court should not have decertified plaintiffs’ class because of the pattern-and-practice nature of their claims).
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citing laws that required parties to directly petition federal appellate courts, which lack formal rules to hear class actions.17
This wasn’t always the case. Even when a statute appeared
to call for direct appellate review, courts once allowed class actions against government agencies in trial courts.18 But this is
now rare.19 Today, courts strictly follow these so-called channeling

17 See, e.g., J.E.F.M., 837 F.3d at 1031–33 (rejecting class action in federal district
court because of exclusive appellate court review of immigration removal proceedings);
Veterans for Common Sense, 678 F.3d at 1028, 1032 (rejecting class action in federal district court because of the veteran court’s exclusive appellate court jurisdiction over veterans’ benefits decisions); Elgin v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 641 F.3d 6, 12–13 (1st Cir. 2011)
(rejecting a putative class for gender discrimination and unlawful bill of attainder claims).
Just before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court decided Garland v. Aleman
Gonzales, 142 S. Ct. 2057 (2022) which held that a provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), prevents courts (other than the
Supreme Court) from granting class-wide injunctive relief under certain provisions covered by that statute. See Aleman Gonzales, 142 S. Ct at 2065 (holding that class-wide
injunctions requiring bond hearings for detained immigrants violated § 1252(f) because
“they require officials to take actions [under a covered provision] that (in the Government’s
view) are not required”). It is possible that certain classes for injunctive relief for appointed
counsel claims could be similarly understood to be barred under the INA. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(4) (requiring that attorneys be available “at no expense to the government”).
However, this is far from clear, and Aleman Gonzales expressly leaves open the possibility
that parties can still seek declaratory relief as a class. 142 S. Ct. at 2065 n.2; see also, e.g.,
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 962 (2019) (holding that courts have jurisdiction to hear
claims for declaratory relief notwithstanding § 1252(f)); Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct.
830, 875 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that declaratory relief class actions remain
available notwithstanding § 1252(f)); Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007, 1015 (3d. Cir. 2011)
(“The distinct purpose and effect of a [class-wide] declaration, as compared to an injunction, presents an entirely plausible basis upon which Congress might choose to bar one
form of relief but not the other.”). Finally, Aleman Gonzales does not say whether § 1252(f)
prevents federal appellate courts from granting relief under the All Writs Act to review
legal or constitutional questions under a different statutory provision, § 1252(a)(2)(D),
when immigration courts unreasonably delay or refuse to adjudicate a class of claims at all.
18 See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991) (permitting class action in district court on due process questions that were deemed collateral to
the statutory scheme channeling review of immigration decisions); Reno v. Cath. Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56 (1993) (holding that the channeling statute did not preclude
district court jurisdiction over the legality of the regulation); Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d
884, 887 (8th Cir. 1987) (permitting a class action challenge in district court).
19 Even in 1989, a survey for the ACUS found that exclusive appellate review broadly
encompassed delay cases, constitutional challenges for “bias and prejudgment,” “procedural challenges,” “challenges to an agency’s authority,” as well as “arbitrary and capricious challenges.” Thomas O. Sargentich, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Administrative Cases: Developments, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 201, 213–14 (1989) (observing that the
“already considerable body of [ ] caselaw” was “continually expanding.”); see also David
Ames, Cassandra Handan-Nader, Daniel E. Ho & David Marcus, Due Process and Mass
Adjudication: Crisis and Reform, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (2020) (collecting cases finding
that tests used to determine when district courts hear such questions “tend to exclude
those alleging systemic inaccuracy in adjudicator decisionmaking”). Notably, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear appeals of two cases for its 2022 term that could cut back on this

1424

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1419

statutes so long as Congress’s intent is just “fairly discernible”
from the face of the law.20
The rationale for this is straightforward. Congress should be
able to choose which lower courts review what the government
does, so long as that review is “meaningful.”21 To that end, direct
appellate review is supposed to promote government accountability, curb gamesmanship and forum-shopping by litigants, and reduce uncertainty.22 Especially for large government bodies operating across the country, appellate courts offer the ability to
quickly, consistently, and authoritatively decide the law without
a duplicative layer of review in trial courts.23
Nevertheless, barriers to class actions have obstructed judicial review over scores of government agencies that perform
“mass adjudication”—where agencies use large numbers of adjudicators and officers to hear thousands of unrepresented claimants—including those that decide millions of asylum applications,
veterans’ benefit cases, federal personnel questions, pension determinations, as well as black lung and other disability benefits

trend: Cochran v. SEC and Axon Entertainment, Inc. v. FTC, 986 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2021).
In both cases, the Court will consider whether district courts should be able to hear broad
constitutional challenges to an administrative scheme, notwithstanding laws that ordinarily channel review into federal appellate courts. SEC v. Cochran, No. 21-1239, 2022
WL 1528373, at *1 (2022); Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022).
20 See Elgin, 567 U.S. at 14–15 (rejecting class action in district court because the
“integrated scheme of review” in appellate court was designed to reduce “inconsistent decisionmaking,” “duplicative judicial review,” and “parallel litigation” in multiple venues
based upon how litigants characterize their claims); see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207–09 (1994) (finding that it was “fairly discernible” that Congress
wanted courts of appeals to exclusively review agency challenges under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Amendments Act); Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 16–17 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear procedural and separation-ofpowers challenges to SEC hearings under a channeling statute).
21 Elgin, 567 U.S. at 15; see also Thunder Basin Coal Co., 510 U.S. at 215 & n.20.
22 See David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (1975); ADMIN.
CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 75-3: THE CHOICE OF FORUM FOR JUD.
REV. OF ADMIN. ACTION (1975), https://perma.cc/AGM6-YBWK [hereinafter “ACUS,
Recommendation 75-3”].
23 Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Appellate courts develop an expertise concerning the agencies assigned them for review. Exclusive jurisdiction promotes judicial economy and fairness to the litigants by taking advantage of that expertise.”); see also Robert L. Chiesa, Frank A. Kaufman, Robert M.
Landis, A. Leo Levin, James E. Noland, Maurice Rosenberg, Mary M. Schroeder, Robert
S. Thompson & Daniel J. Meador, The United States Courts of Appeals: Reexamining
Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, 125 F.R.D. 523, 539 (1989) (describing
the “principal benefit” of channeling as a way to promote “nationwide uniformity in a program administered by a single, national agency”).
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cases every year.24 Because of their heavy case loads, agencies administering these government programs are more prone to mishandle records, misinterpret precedent, lose track of petitioners,
and suffer from chronic delays as they hear large numbers of individual cases without lawyers.25 Worse yet, as I’ve argued elsewhere, very few federal agencies hear class actions themselves.26
Without the ability to commence class actions at any level of adjudication, many system-wide government problems never reach
the federal appellate courts that are supposed to review them.
This Article argues that when federal appellate courts directly review large government programs, they should be able to
hear class actions themselves. In such cases, appellate courts
could hear class-wide claims for injunctive relief that roughly
track the basic elements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. If necessary, appellate courts could conduct factfinding through the use of special masters27 or limited remands to
agencies or district courts28 or the exercise of their equitable
24 J.E.F.M., 837 F.3d at 1032–33 (rejecting class action in federal district court because of exclusive appellate court review of immigration removal proceedings); see also
Johnson v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 969 F.2d 1082, 1084–87, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (rejecting
class action in federal district court because of exclusive federal appellate jurisdiction over
the Railroad Retirement Board); Arch Coal, Inc. v. Acosta, 888 F.3d 493, 499–500 (D.C.
Cir. 2018) (noting the exclusive appellate court review of the Black Lung Benefit Program).
25 See, e.g., VA OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN.: REVIEW OF
CLAIMS-RELATED DOCUMENTS PENDING DESTRUCTION AT VA REGIONAL OFFICES 3 (2016)
(describing poor document retention related to veterans’ claims); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.—OFF. OF AUDIT, EFFECT OF OALJ STAFFING LEVELS ON THE
BLACK LUNG CASE BACKLOG 2–3 (2017) (finding that the average Department of Labor
adjudication of black lung benefits took 640 days). The D.C. Circuit has described the hurdles to challenging the Railroad Retirement Board. See Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1093 (“If a
railroad spouse . . . has the determination and the financial and physical strength and
lives long enough to make it through the administrative process, he can turn to the
courts. . . . [But i]f exhaustion overtakes him and he falls somewhere along the road . . .
the resulting termination stand[s].”).
26 Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2035–36 (2012) [hereinafter The Agency Class Action]; Michael D.
Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J.
1634, 1641–42 (2017). Of the agency adjudication systems reviewed directly by appellate
courts, only the Merit Systems Protection Board hears class actions.
27 FED. R. APP. P. 48 (allowing courts of appeals to “appoint a special master to hold
hearings”); see also Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr., 750 F.2d at 78 (approving use of special masters to resolve factual disputes where appellate courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over government entities).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3) (2012) (authorizing transfer from courts of appeals to
district courts for the purpose of fact-finding in limited situations); see also Gallo-Alvarez
v. Ashcroft, 266 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2001) (transferring immigration petition for
review to district court “for further development of the record”); FCC v. ITT World
Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 469 (1984) (recommending remands to district courts and
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jurisdiction.29 In so doing, courts high in the judicial hierarchy
would continue to authoritatively decide big legal questions involving government institutions, while ensuring that groups of
similar, unrepresented claimants finally get their day in court.
As it happens, appellate courts can already do this. This is
because of a longstanding gap-filling statute known as the All
Writs Act.30 Although the All Writs Act is “an extraordinary remedy,”31 it is designed precisely for important, recurring legal questions likely to evade judicial review.32 It permits “all courts established by Act of Congress” to issue writs “necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.”33 Relying on the All Writs Act, courts have
developed procedures to respond to systemic violations of law
committed by agencies or lower courts, including “representative
actions” modeled after modern class action rules.34
This Article is the first to examine nascent experiments with
appellate class actions and argue for their expansion. In so doing,
it offers practical and theoretical lessons for how courts ensure
equal access to review our political institutions. On a practical
level, appellate classes permit parties, who often lack access to
counsel, to pool information and resources to challenge government problems.35 Appellate class actions also permit courts to
hear important questions that often evade their review, while effectuating faithful compliance with their orders.36 Exploring the
agencies to develop records when statutes channel judicial review directly to appellate
court).
29 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) (noting that the court could compel
interrogatories under the All Writs Act, even where no express rule for discovery was
available, to “provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry”).
30 Pub. L. No. 117-102, 36 Stat. 1156, 1162 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651).
31 Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980).
32 See In re Google LLC, 949 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed Cir. 2020) (concluding that a writ
was appropriate to address a “fundamental and recurring issue” in patent law); United
States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that a writ was appropriate to address
recurring issues “of substantial public importance”); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104,
110 (1964).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
34 See, e.g., Monk, 855 F.3d at 1319 (allowing the aggregation of veteran mandamus
petitions under the All Writs Act); United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115,
1125 (2d Cir. 1974) (aggregating habeas petitions using the All Writs Act).
35 The Agency Class Action, supra note 26, at 2023–24 (observing that adjudication
based on precedent and stare decisis requires lawyers to “find relevant precedents, interpret their significance to the case at hand, and advocate how they should be applied”); 2
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:35 (5th ed. 2021) (collecting cases).
36 See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, 222 F.R.D. 324, 334 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (certifying
a class challenge when it is “not clear that any injunctive relief awarded to an individual
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practical benefits of appellate classes is particularly timely. At
the time of this writing, over twenty appellate class actions have
been filed and—in November 2020—one federal appellate court
announced new rules to hear class actions against the
Department of Veterans Affairs.37 Those rules were modeled after
several recent appellate class actions the court had heard under
the All Writs Act, including an erstwhile $6.5 billion lawsuit that
for a time stood as the largest government class action in modern
history.38
But beyond their practical value, appellate classes raise
novel questions about how judges can and should exercise power
over facts, the coordinate branches of government, and procedural
rules designed to limit their authority. When appellate courts certify class actions, they risk upsetting the balance of power between themselves and the fact-finding tribunals they review.
They also place the legality of the government’s nationwide programs in the hands of a single regional appellate court.39 And they
may avoid formal processes that courts traditionally use to make
rules openly and fairly.40 This Article argues, however, that

plaintiff will automatically inure to the benefit of the class as a whole”); Reynolds v.
Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 391–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class
challenge to food-stamp administration because the case “involve[d] a fluid class where
the claims of the named plaintiffs may become moot” and “defendants ha[d] the ability to
moot the claims of the named plaintiffs, thereby evading judicial review of their conduct”).
37 See U.S. VET. APP. R. 22; U.S. VET. APP. R. 23.
38 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321; Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1, 34 (2019), rev’d sub nom.
Wolfe v. McDonough, 28 F.4th 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2022). The Wolfe class involves over seventyseven thousand veterans wrongfully denied emergency room benefits. Compensation may
nearly double the federal government’s previously record-setting $3.4 billion Cobell settlement, which resolved claims by Native Americans against the United States after the
Department of Interior mismanaged funds that were held in trust. Compare Courtney
Kube, Mosheh Gains & Adiel Kaplan, Court Rules VA Must Pay for Veterans’ Emergency
Care, A Decision that May Be Worth Billions, NBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5S6C-AQ3L, with U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, CONSULTATIONS ON COBELL
TRUST LAND CONSOLIDATION, https://perma.cc/335V-UABU. As this Article was going to
press, the Federal Circuit held that the Wolfe class was not entitled to the relief it sought
because the parties could have obtained the same relief through the traditional appellate
process and not through a writ of mandamus. McDonough, 28 F.4th at 1360. In so doing,
the Federal Circuit broke with other federal appellate courts’ readings of the All Writs
Act. Those courts have used mandamus to resolve recurring questions, thereby avoiding
delays, “the potential for massive future litigation,” Am. Trucking Ass’n v. ICC, 669 F.2d
957, 961 (5th Cir. 1982), and high-volume adjudication. See infra Part II.A.
39 Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 729 (1989) (offering a limited defense of executive power to
resist regional appellate courts).
40 Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1687 (2017)
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appellate courts can adopt class actions consistent with the judiciary’s historic role in reviewing agency action.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the problems appellate courts face when they have exclusive review over
unlawful government actions. Canvassing almost two hundred
channeling statutes, Part I shows how Congress often assigns
courts to review the government without accounting for group
challenges to executive action. It then details how, without class
actions, government agencies avoid judicial review by selectively
mooting claims, forcing unrepresented parties to surmount overwhelming administrative backlogs and denying courts critical information needed to craft meaningful relief.
Part II describes how appellate courts have used the All
Writs Act to fashion new procedures in aid of their jurisdiction,
including class action rules. Relying on the All Writs Act, appellate courts long ago developed rules to review systemic government misconduct—most notably in the context of “habeas class
actions”—without a specific rule to do so. Recently, a federal appellate court that directly reviews one of the nation’s largest mass
adjudication programs, which is administered by the Department
of Veterans Affairs, began entertaining class actions in systemic
government challenges under the All Writs Act. That court’s
power under the All Writs Act is no different from any other federal appellate court that directly reviews government challenges.41 And its recent experience using that power highlights
how other appellate courts can develop factual records, resolve
large numbers of cases, and offer more effective relief through
class actions without overburdening their dockets.
Part III examines what appellate class actions mean for traditional limits on fact-finding, procedural experimentation, and
separation of powers. Appellate courts usually make “aggregate”
decisions not through class actions but through their power to issue binding, precedential opinions—incrementally adopting rules
that apply to common claims from case to case. Precedential decision-making ordinarily respects the traditional boundaries of appellate jurisdiction and separation of powers by allowing political

(“[J]udicial intervention has been generally more controversial than development through
the formal rulemaking process.”).
41 Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“By its express terms, the [All
Writs Act] unambiguously applies to ‘all courts established by Act of Congress.’ The Court
of Veterans Appeals is such a court.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651)).
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branches to create uniform national programs and test their legality in different regional appellate courts.
If they do so cautiously, however, appellate courts can adopt
class procedures consistent with the judiciary’s role in reviewing
agency action, its place in our governmental framework, and the
boundaries of its procedural authority. First, courts acting in an
appellate capacity have historically considered new facts to determine whether government officials acted unlawfully.42 Moreover,
procedural experiments may be particularly justified when
policymakers cannot anticipate or design procedural rules without insights from case-by-case adjudication.43 Finally, appellate
class procedures may promote better interactions between the judicial and executive branches, allowing courts to review recurring
problems and avoid piecemeal remedies that frustrate the operation of a national bureaucracy.44
In sum, in cases of systemic government misconduct, appellate courts may need to flexibly aggregate claims to protect their
own status in our system of checks and balances—ensuring that
they hear parties’ claims, expound legal rules, and craft meaningful relief for unrepresented people facing off against big government bureaucracies. Without a class-wide judgment in such
cases, courts risk ceding power to the executive branch to decide
for itself which judicial decisions limit the government’s own unlawful policies.
I. THE PERILS OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF SYSTEMIC
GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT
Over the last century, Congress has passed hundreds of laws
that determine which courts review what the government does.45
But, as set out in Part I.A, Congress rarely takes into account the
problems an appellate court may have reviewing systemic issues
raised by a large group of people against a government organization.
The result, as set forth in Part I.B, is a significant problem
for appellate courts that directly review government bureaucracies serving many people without lawyers. Without a class action
42

See infra Part III.A.
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 9, 15 (1942) (observing that if Congress had to itemize every permissible judicial procedure and remedy, it would “stultify
the purpose of Congress to utilize the courts as a means for vindicating the public interest”); see also infra Part III.C.
44 See infra Part III.B.
45 See Appendix A.
43
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rule, appellate courts may not be able to meaningfully review
what the government does, provide coherent relief, or ensure that
the executive branch complies with their decisions.
A. Congress’s Haphazard Approach to Judicial Review by
District and Appellate Courts
For almost 150 years, Congress has vested federal district
courts with original jurisdiction over cases that arise under federal law.46 But, for almost as long, Congress has also passed laws
that establish which government actions courts can review, as
well as which courts can review them.47 Under the Administrative
Procedure Act,48 Congress can bar judicial review of an agency’s
decisions by passing laws that expressly prevent courts from reviewing certain issues.49 Congress may also choose whether a trial
or appellate court conducts judicial review.50
As a general rule, Congress has more freedom to choose
which courts review government actions than whether courts can
do so at all. Laws that completely bar judicial review raise “serious constitutional question[s]” because they explicitly limit judicial power to review executive actions that affect individual
rights.51 But so long as some court can “meaningfully” review
what the government does, Congress can flexibly write laws

46

28 U.S.C. § 1331.
See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, ch. 311, 38
Stat. 717, 720 (1914) (“The jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals of the United States
to enforce, set aside, or modify orders of the commission shall be exclusive.”). Other contemporaneous laws also channeled disputes into three-judge courts with various procedural powers. See, e.g., Hepburn Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-337, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584,
592 (1906) (conferring jurisdiction on courts to “enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any
order or requirement of the [Interstate Commerce Commission]”); Mann-Elkins Act of
1910, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 539 (1910) (creating a special Article III
circuit court to review the Interstate Commerce Commission).
48 Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
49 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). But see Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)
(preserving judicial review under the APA absent “clear and convincing” evidence of a
“contrary legislative intent”).
50 5 U.S.C. § 703 (“The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory
review proceeding relevant to the subject matter.”).
51 Bowen v. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681, 681 n.12 (1986); see also
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1378–79 (1953). For recent accounts questioning this assumption, see Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and
the Process of Constitutional Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1778, 1825 (2020) and Nicholas
Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014).
47
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requiring that parties sue the government in federal district
courts, appellate courts, or both.52
Using that power, Congress has enacted almost two hundred
statutes covering more than fifty different federal agencies that
channel review directly into federal appellate courts. These statutes cover agencies that hear a small number of high stakes cases,
like billion-dollar patent disputes filed in the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board.53 But they also cover a wide variety of federal bodies that hear many smaller-dollar cases without lawyers—like the
Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Justice, and
Department of Labor, which hear hundreds of thousands of veterans, immigration, and federal benefit cases each year.54 The
agencies that are subject to the largest numbers of channeling
statutes are a diverse mix that resolve big and little cases: the
Department of Agriculture (21), Department of Transportation
(19), Environmental Protection Agency (17), Department of Labor
(13), Department of Health and Human Services (13), Department
of Justice (9), Department of Housing and Urban Development
(9), Security and Exchange Commission (7) and Department of
Veterans Affairs (5).55
Unfortunately, Congress frequently chooses who decides—
district courts or appellate courts—without much consideration
of their comparative strengths, weaknesses, and procedural rules.
Sometimes the selection of a court for review of a government
agency may almost be an afterthought of Congress—a by-product
of a governmental reorganization or new official assignment
within an agency. In 1973, for example, courts of appeals began
directly reviewing the Black Lung Benefits Program, a mass adjudication system that was established to compensate an
52 See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 & n.20 (1994); Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1974); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298
U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The supremacy of law demands that there
shall be opportunity to have some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied.” (emphasis added)); see also Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“If a
special statutory review scheme exists [in the federal appellate courts] . . . ‘it is ordinarily
supposed that Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive means of obtaining
judicial review.’” (quoting City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).
53 35 U.S.C. § 141; Matthew Bultman, Fed. Circ. Tosses VirnetX’s $600M Award in
Apple Patent Fight, LAW306 (Nov. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZGA7-HU73.
54 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (providing for exclusive review of veterans benefits in
the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims); 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (providing for exclusive appellate review of federal longshoreman benefits, black lung benefits, and other federal
benefit programs); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9) (providing for exclusive appellate review
over removal proceedings).
55 See Appendix A.
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estimated five hundred thousand coal miners with lung disease.56
But the reason had little to do with whether black lung claims
raised unique legal questions for appellate review.57 Rather,
Congress had simply moved the Black Lung Benefits Program
from the Social Security Administration (whose decisions are reviewed by district courts) to the Department of Labor (whose compensation schemes are reviewed by courts of appeals).58
In other cases, channeling can create piecemeal review in
both district and appellate courts.59 For example, in some circuits,
procedural due process challenges to the “No-Fly List,” are heard
by district courts that review lawsuits against the Terrorist
Screening Center, a government body that makes rules for who
can board commercial aircrafts.60 But substantive due process
challenges to the No-Fly List are exclusively reviewed by appellate courts.61
These problems are not new. For over fifty years, judges and
commentators have chastised Congress’s haphazard approach to
selecting which courts will review unlawful government actions.62
56 30 U.S.C. §§ 924, 931–932; Daniel N. Price, Black Lung Benefits Revision, 45 SOC.
SEC. BULL. 26 (1982).
57 In fact, given the volume of black lung cases, at the time, contemporaneous observers feared that the unexplained shift to federal appellate courts would “prove to be a
source of serious, if temporary, docket pressures for the courts of appeals a year or two
from now, and that it bears close watching.” Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 39.
58 Even so, a substantial portion of early black lung claims still remained with the
Social Security Administration after that. Price, supra note 56, at 26 (observing that between 1970 and 1982, 82% of the $12 billion had been paid by the SSA). That meant that
review by district courts and appellate courts for virtually the same kind of challenges to
the Black Lung Benefits Program would turn on whether claims were filed before or after
July 1973.
59 Loan Syndications & Trading Ass’n v. SEC, 818 F.3d 716, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(observing that “the U.S. Code is littered ‘with thousands of compromises dividing initial
review of agency decisions between district and circuit courts’” (quoting Joseph W. Mead
& Nicholas A. Fromherz, Choosing a Court To Review the Executive, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 1,
2 (2015))).
60 See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141–43 (D. Or. 2014).
61 Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 391–92 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that the 2015
amendments to the No-Fly List required direct appellate review and dismissing a substantive due process claim). This is because Congress amended the law in 2015 to require that
a separate agency, the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), decide who is on the
list. TSA programs have long been exclusively reviewed by appellate courts. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 46110 (stating that “a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order issued by . . .
the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration” must file a petition for
review in the D.C. Circuit or the Court of Appeals where the petitioner resides).
62 See, e.g., Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 5; HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 176 (1973); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 420–22 (1965) (observing unclear language in many specialreview statutes as a result of poor legislative oversight); Note, Jurisdiction to Review
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After all, district and appellate courts occupy very different roles
in the federal judicial hierarchy, with different procedural rules
governing how they find facts, join parties and claims, and decide
binding questions of law.
In 1975, Professors David Currie and Frank Goodman exhaustively studied channeling statutes for the Administrative
Conference of the United States, a federal body that studies how
other federal agencies work.63 Their recommendations, endorsed
by the federal government, encouraged legislators to account for
trial and appellate courts’ different positions when Congress
passed laws providing for judicial review.64 They argued that appellate courts were best suited to review administrative questions
that presented substantial legal issues, given appellate courts’
power to issue precedential decisions that bind large regions of
the country.65
Their theory was that direct review by an appellate court
could save parties from delay and confusion by offering a quicker
path to a binding precedential decision.66 Government agencies
already produce a voluminous record by offering “trial type” hearings. So, appellate courts often would not need district courts to
play the same role.67 For that reason, Currie and Goodman argued
that direct review by appellate courts provided a more direct, coherent form of judicial oversight, except in cases where the district courts needed to develop facts or provide another layer of
review to reduce appellate caseloads.68 Appellate courts, they

Federal Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 980,
984 (1975) (“[I]n many cases there appears to be no purpose served by the limited language
of a special review statute, and the language appears most likely to have resulted only
from legislative oversight.”).
63 Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 3.
64 ACUS, Recommendation 75-3, supra note 22, at 2–4.
65 See id. at 2 (“The courts of appeals, burdened by rapidly increasing caseloads that
threaten the quality of their decisions, constitute a scarce resource that should be reserved, to the extent possible, for the resolution of issues of law or policy issues of major
impact.”).
66 Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 6 (“Assuming appeal as of right from district
to appellate court, bypassing the trial court significantly expedites ultimate decision, lessening the burden on both courts and litigants.”); see also Note, supra note 62, at 983
(“These statutes may also be designed to expedite the implementation of an agency’s program by reducing the delays associated with judicial review.”).
67 Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 5 (“The key point is that the district court is
unnecessary here because the functions it ordinarily performs in the judicial system are
either performed by the administrative agency itself or are relatively unimportant.”).
68 Id. at 17–19; ACUS, Recommendation 75-3, supra note 22, at 2–3:
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concluded, offered “superior decision-making” for reviewing large
government programs because of their power to “develop and
maintain a uniform and coherent case law” across the country. 69
In some cases, Congress requires direct review for precisely
these reasons. Congress may want to streamline litigation into a
more experienced appellate court capable of announcing binding
precedent. The Administrative Orders Review Act,70 which sends
many agency challenges directly into appellate courts, was primarily designed to avoid “the making of two records, one before
the agency and one before the court, and thus going over the same
ground twice.”71 The same is true for another program, the U.S.
Railroad Retirement Board, which has paid nearly $12.7 billion
in retirement-survivor benefits to about 540,000 beneficiaries.72
When Congress shifted review from district to appellate courts, it
hoped to avoid the “further expense” of additional appeals and to
provide final and “careful consideration . . . in the circuit court of
appeals.”73 Today, courts often cite these very considerations—
claimant convenience, streamlined review, and appellate expertise—to require that parties directly challenge government agencies in appellate courts.74
This kind of approach may be sensible in areas of administrative law where lawyers represent sophisticated businesses
that could challenge agencies that ignored appellate precedent.

The district court should not be interposed unless the administrative action to
be reviewed is of a type: (a) that rarely involves issues of law or of broad social
or economic impact warranting routine review by a multimember court, and
(b) such that district court review would significantly reduce the workload of the
appellate courts.
69

Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 12.
Pub. Law No. 81-901, ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2342).
71 H.R. REP. NO. 2122, at 4 (1950). The same was true for earlier variants of such
bills. Some early channeling laws assigned direct review to appellate courts, while others
assigned review to three-judge district court panels, with direct review by the Supreme
Court. Compare Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 717, 720 (1914) (establishing exclusive jurisdiction in appellate courts), with Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, 38
Stat. 208, 220 (1913) (establishing specialized three-judge district courts).
72 U.S.
R.R. RET. BENEFITS BD.,
AN AGENCY OVERVIEW
(2019),
https://perma.cc/Y7B6-87SU?type=image.
73 Hearings on H.R. 1362 Before the House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1084–85 (1946).
74 See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 14 (2012); Telecomms. Rsch. And
Action Ctr., 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Appellate courts develop an expertise concerning the agencies assigned them for review. Exclusive jurisdiction promotes judicial
economy and fairness to the litigants by taking advantage of that expertise. In addition,
exclusive jurisdiction eliminates duplicative and potentially conflicting review.”).
70
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Indeed, plaintiffs using many early channeling laws were often
large, powerful organizations, like monopolies,75 media companies,76 investment firms,77 and state government bodies.78 But
commentators have long missed the unique problems facing systemwide challenges to government practices that impact diffuse
groups of unrepresented people. As explained below, this is a particular problem in “high volume” adjudication programs—veteran
benefits, immigration, federal workers compensation, and employment programs—that together involve millions of cases a
year. In these fields, appellate courts cannot protect large groups
of unrepresented people from systemic government dysfunction
or misconduct without tools to aggregate them.79

75 The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-312, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified
in scattered sections of U.S.C.), directed into appellate courts challenges to cease-anddesist orders by the Federal Trade Commission, Surface Transportation Board, Federal
Communications Commission, Department of Transportation, and the Federal Reserve.
See 15 U.S.C. § 21.
76 The Administrative Orders Review Act, discussed above, sent many early radio
and television challenges to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) into federal appellate courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342; 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); see also Jason N. Sigalos, The
Other Hobbs Act: An Old Leviathan in the Modern Administrative State, 54 GA. L. REV.
1095, 1108 (2020) (noting that when the Hobbs Act was written the FCC covered “two
areas: (1) issuing licenses to radio stations and (2) regulating communications common
carriers”).
77 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 78 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21, and the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64, all contain similarly worded provisions for exclusive appellate
review. See 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (Securities Act); § 80b–13(a) (Advisers Act); § 80a–42(a)
(Company Act); see also Appendix A.
78 Federal appellate courts directly hear many preemption, funding, and territorial
challenges by state government. See 49 U.S.C. § 31141(f) (reviewing the Transportation
Secretary’s decisions related to preemption of state laws and regulations); 31 U.S.C. § 6717
(covering challenges to suspension of federal payments to states by the Treasury
Secretary); 16 U.S.C. § 160a–1 (covering challenges to decisions by the Department of
Interior to revert land from states to the United States).
79 To be sure, other commentators have recognized the limits of appellate precedent
in responding to systemic problems in mass adjudication. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach &
David Marcus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX.
L. REV. 1097, 1120–21 (2018); Christopher J. Walker, Referral, Remand, and Dialogue in
Administrative Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 84, 87–88 (2016) [hereinafter Referral];
Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency
Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1587–90 (2014). For example, Professor
Christopher Walker observes that appellate courts can obtain concessions at oral argument, retain jurisdiction, or use other tools to “communicate to the agency specific—and
oftentimes even systemic—problems identified by the reviewing court.” Referral, supra, at
89–90. Professors Jonah Gelbach and David Marcus argue that repeat oversight and pressure by courts can accomplish similar goals. Gelbach & Marcus, supra, at 1148. My recommendation that courts of appeals consider the use of class actions under the All Writs
Act expands upon those kinds of procedural innovations.
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B. The Limits of Individualized Appellate Review
One principal reason for direct appellate review, discussed
above, is to ensure that appellate courts retain the power to perform their core function—to “develop and maintain a uniform and
coherent case law” in government litigation.80 But, as I discuss in
this Section, appellate courts often cannot do that in lawsuits
challenging systemic government misconduct without class actions. First, appellate courts may not be able to review unlawful
administrative policies that become moot or frustrate parties’
ability to appeal at all. Second, without a class, parties often lack
access to counsel, resources, and formal procedures to ensure that
the agency follows appellate court precedent. Third, courts may
lack information about how to structure relief for an unlawful
government practice that impacts large groups of people when
they hear cases one at a time. This Section concludes by showing
how, in this way, class actions are consistent with what Congress
wants when it sends challenges to government actions directly
into appellate courts.
1. Inherently temporary or frustrated appeals.
Some government policies or practices are inherently transitory or compromise a petitioner’s ability to obtain judicial review
at all. These include systems that shackle parties before trial, impose excessive fees or bonds, deny lawyers timely access to records, or unreasonably delay the docketing of internal appeals inside an administrative agency.81 When those claims proceed
individually, they often disappear before they ever reach a

80

Currie & Goodman, supra note 22, at 12.
See, e.g., De Abadia-Peixoto v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 277 F.R.D. 572, 574
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (using a civil class action to challenge an Immigration and Customs
Enforcement policy of shackling all detainees in San Francisco’s immigration court); VA
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF CLAIMSRELATED DOCUMENTS PENDING DESTRUCTION AT VA REGIONAL OFFICES. 3 (2016) (describing poor document retention related to veterans’ claims); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN.—OFF. OF AUDIT, EFFECT OF OALJ STAFFING LEVELS ON THE BLACK LUNG
CASE BACKLOG 2–3 (2017) (finding that Department of Labor adjudication of black lung
benefits took an average of 640 days); Michael D. Shear & Katie Benner, In New Effort to
Deter Migrants, Barr Withholds Bail to Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://perma.cc/X5ZN-VD4R (describing a new policy to keep thousands of asylum applicants in jail indefinitely without bond in a “significant step to discourage migrants from
seeking asylum” in immigration hearings).
81
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judicial forum.82 Those same unlawful practices may also prevent
parties from obtaining legal access to challenge them.
Some government agencies, for example, may selectively pick
off meritorious claims before courts can issue a decision. For
years, individual veterans challenging system-wide problems in
the Department of Veterans Affairs’ benefit system could not obtain judicial review in response to mandamus petitions in appellate court. As one court observed, a “great majority of the time”
the Secretary would simply respond to a petition for mandamus
“by correcting the problem within the short time allotted for a response, and the petition [would be] dismissed as moot.”83 As a result, of the more than one thousand petitions seeking mandamus
in the court of appeals in the VA between fiscal years 2015 and
2017, the court managed to review only 40% and granted just one
per year.84
Other unlawful policies may practically prevent parties from
ever reaching an appellate court. In immigration removal proceedings, for example, the Department of Homeland Security
might unlawfully enter default decisions (known as “in absentia
orders”) against unaccompanied minor children without lawyers
when they fail to show up for their asylum hearings.85 But no process exists for challenging the immigration courts’ systemic policy
of entering default judgments and illegally ordering the deportation of children without providing them opportunities to find

82 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (finding
an individual challenge to pretrial shackling moot following the petitioner’s release).
83 Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Case law is replete with
such examples.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also Dotson v. McDonald, No. 16-2813,
2016 WL 5335437, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 23, 2016) (dismissing as moot a petition for a writ
of mandamus compelling the VA to adjudicate an appeal because the VA adjudicated the
appeal seven days after the petition was filed); Dalpiaz v. McDonald, No. 16-2602, 2016
WL 4702423, at *1 (Vet. App. Sept. 8, 2016) (dismissing as moot a petition for a writ of
mandamus compelling the VA to adjudicate an appeal because the VA adjudicated the
appeal at an unspecified time within about a month of the petition’s filing).
84 ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS: OCT. 1, 2016 TO SEPT.
30, 2017 (FISCAL YEAR 2017) 1–2 (2018); ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS
CLAIMS: OCT. 1, 2015 TO SEPT. 30, 2016 (FISCAL YEAR 2016) 1–2 (2017); ANNUAL REPORT,
U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS: OCT. 1, 2014 TO SEPT. 30, 2015 (FISCAL YEAR 2015)
1–2 (2016).
85 See, e.g., Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1161–63 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s failure to give proper notice to children’s guardians violated due process, particularly when it might have resulted in a deportation order in absentia).
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lawyers. Children with lawyers lack standing.86 Children without
lawyers are deported.87
Courts adopted class actions to overcome these concerns. In
a class action, the class representative can assert claims on behalf
of parties where “joinder of all [class] members [is] impracticable,”88 including in cases involving deported children, veterans
with PTSD, mentally disabled adults, or other vulnerable groups
unable to assert rights on their own. Class actions can continue
even after the lead plaintiff’s individual claim becomes moot so
long as members of the class continue to have a live controversy.89
This is true regardless of the reason—whether the plaintiff is released, retains counsel, or simply ages out of a government
program.90
To be sure, some legal doctrines allow courts to review claims
against the government that repeatedly avoid review.91 And the
fact that some cases become moot is not always bad. Doctrines
like mootness allow courts to avoid deciding abstract, far-ranging
constitutional questions.92 One court has described the potential
86 C.J.L.G. v Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 630 (9th Cir. 2019) (Paez, J., concurring) (“The majority states that because [the child] now has counsel, we need not address his argument
that appointed counsel is constitutionally required for indigent children in removal
proceedings.”).
87 Id. (observing that “[s]uch cases are extremely difficult to bring” and that after the
only other such case settled, “thousands of unrepresented children have been ordered
removed”).
88 Monk, 855 F.3d at 1319.
89 U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 401–02 (1975); Monk, 855 F.3d at 1319, 1321 (observing that a “claim aggregation
procedure” avoids mootness and thus “may help the [court of appeals] achieve the goal of
reviewing the VA’s delay in adjudicating appeals”).
90 See, e.g., Clay v. Pelle, No. 10-CV-01840, 2011 WL 843920, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 8,
2011); Mental Disability L. Clinic v. Hogan, No. CV-06-6320, 2008 WL 4104460, at *21
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2008).
91 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 439–40 (2011) (holding that plaintiff’s claim
was not moot, despite plaintiff completing his prison sentence, because the dispute was
“‘capable of repetition’ while ‘evading review’” (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219
U.S. 498, 515 (1911)); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318–22 (1988) (holding the same for
plaintiffs who either aged out of the Education of the Handicapped Act or were not currently facing the disciplinary procedures at issue in the case). But see DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318–20 (1974) (holding that plaintiff’s challenge of state law
school admissions procedure was moot because future applicants might have subsequently
challenged the procedure, and therefore the issue was not likely to evade review).
92 See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 n.11 (1980) (“[O]ne of the
principal reasons to await the termination of agency proceedings is ‘to obviate all occasion
for judicial review.’” (quoting McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971))); cf.
Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a collateral civil
challenge of the constitutionality of an intendent counsel’s authority was impermissible in
part to avoid review of “far-ranging and troubling constitutional” questions); Ashwander

2022]

The Class Appeal

1439

for mootness as “a feature . . ., not a bug” of some channeling
statutes.93
Nevertheless, in many cases, appellate courts may still need
class actions to address systemic government challenges. First,
doctrines that allow courts to review questions that repeatedly
evade review only apply in “exceptional situations.”94 Without a
class action, it is not enough for a petitioner to show that the same
government practice repeatedly impacts other people; they must
show that their own claim will repeatedly avoid review.95 Second,
in many cases, appellate courts cannot review cases they are supposed to review without a way to join people that cannot otherwise practically be found. Without a class, unrepresented claimants with the same complaint may botch filing requirements,
miss deadlines, or fail to preserve their rights for appeal.96
Finally, when enough people suffer from a common practice to
qualify for a class action, mooting one claim simply does not solve
the problem raised by a systemic unlawful practice. In those
cases, the possibility of a future claim is not a general, abstract
issue, but remains a live, contested question for hundreds or thousands of others. 97
2. Informality, delays, and obstacles to legal
representation.
Without a class action, parties also lose access to counsel, resources, and procedures that ensure that the agency observes appellate precedent. Some mass tribunals conduct hundreds of
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court [has]
developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series
of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision.”).
93 Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original).
94 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
95 Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1538–42 (holding that an unlawful shackling claim
was moot outside of a class action because plaintiff would not be subject to practice again
without committing a crime).
96 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1, 12 (2019) (“Who knows how many veterans relied on such a [government] misrepresentation—for that is what it was—in deciding
not to appeal VA decisions that denied reimbursement for non-VA emergency medical
care[?]”).
97 See, e.g., Wilson v. Gordon, 822 F.3d 934, 951 (6th Cir. 2016) (granting class certification of class of Medicaid recipients for system-wide delays and observing that the refusal to “consider a class-wide remedy merely because individual class members no longer
need relief would mean that no remedy could ever be provided for continuing abuses” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329, 333 (6th
Cir. 1978))).
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thousands of hearings annually, without obligations to provide
attorneys or adopt formal hearing procedures.98 Appellate courts
may have much more trouble ensuring that mass-adjudication
programs comply with their decisions when unsophisticated parties lack access to class counsel capable of understanding and applying appellate precedent to new cases.99 Those problems are aggravated by the small amount at stake in many government
benefit decisions.
Take Johnson v. U.S. Railroad Retirement Benefit Board.100
Johnson’s husband died, leaving her with five children and a
small monthly pension of $391.11 from the U.S. Railroad
Retirement Benefit Board. But when Johnson’s youngest daughter turned sixteen, her government benefits were cut to $84.11—
even though the court of appeals had repeatedly held that recipients should receive benefits until their children reached
eighteen.101 When she appealed, one board official concluded that
controlling precedent required cutting her benefits, even though
precedent “explicitly require[d] the opposite result.”102 After another administrative appeal, a second official rejected her argument because the controlling precedent was not a “class action
case and the [government] did not pursue it further.”103 When
Johnson then brought a class action in federal district court, the
court of appeals chastised the U.S. Railroad Board’s “bold challenge to judicial authority.”104 And it recognized that, without a
class, “few claimants will actually obtain the relief to which federal courts say they are entitled by law.”105 Nevertheless, the court
rejected her class action because the governing statute required
that she bring her $307 claim for lost monthly benefits in the
court of appeals.106

98 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323–25 (1985) (approving of the use of informal procedures in veterans-claims and prison-disciplinary hearings).
99 Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1661, 1681 (2000) (“When classwide litigation leads to reform of systemic practices, the
benefits may be shared with unrepresented aliens; when counsel prevails . . . in an individual case, [the agency] can yield for the occasion without acquiescing in the legal principle more generally.”).
100 969 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
101 Id. at 1083–85.
102 Id. at 1083–84.
103 Id. at 1084 (quotations marks omitted).
104 Id. at 1083.
105 Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1087.
106 Id.
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Unrepresented parties with small claims often cannot hold
agencies accountable to a controlling judicial decision. Overworked administrative judges barely manage to follow even a
fraction of their own administrative appellate decisions.107 In
some cases, an appellate body may not even know about its own
prior decisions.108 Indeed, recently proposed reforms to the Board
of Immigration Appeals aimed to reduce backlogs by facilitating
the promulgation of even more precedential decisions for the nation’s immigration courts, as well as allowing more “affirmances
without opinion,” which are decisions upholding deportation orders without any explanation at all.109
There are certainly other ways to improve legal access in appellate court, but few of them help in risky, complex, and oftentimes expensive government litigation. Legal services organizations, for example, could improve access to legal representation in
appellate courts without a class action. Attorney-fee statutes offer
another solution. And, in very rare cases, when petitioners can
exhaust administrative remedies simultaneously, it may be
“practicable” to join a small number of appeals together under
Rule 3(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.110
But consistent legal representation is rarely practicable, especially given the low sums at stake and the resources required
to mount serial government challenges. Parties in administrative
proceedings may earn too much to qualify for legal aid representation but not enough to afford competent private legal counsel.111

107 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 457 (6th ed. 2009). In
2021, for example, the Social Security Appeals Council received 111,722 requests for review, processed 118,415 dispositions, and still had 50,634 requests for review pending at
the end of the year. SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, GENERAL APPEALS COUNSEL STATISTICS
(2021), https://perma.cc/WAG7-XAW3.
108 See id.
109 Tal Kopan, Trump’s New Attorney General Launches Fresh Changes to Immigration Courts, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/78NB-NJCF.
110 FED. R. APP. P. 3(b) (“When two or more parties are entitled to appeal from a
district-court judgment or order, and their interests make joinder practicable, they may
file a joint notice of appeal. They may then proceed on appeal as a single appellant.”).
111 “The cost of legal representation in Southern California for an adult detained in
removal proceedings, for example, is approximately $4,000–$5,000.” The Agency Class Action, supra note 26, at 2026 n.175 (citing How to Find Legal Help for Non-Detained Adults,
ESPERANZA IMMIGRANT RTS. PROJECT (on file with the Columbia Law Review)). For one
firm surveyed by the Government Accountability Office in 2009, the cost of legal representation for miners pursuing claims for black lung disease ranged from $18,000 for a case
that took two to four years to $70 thousand for a case that took seven or more years. See
U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., BLACK LUNG BENEFITS PROGRAM: ADMINISTRATIVE AND
STRUCTURAL CHANGES COULD IMPROVE MINERS’ ABILITY TO PURSUE CLAIMS 26–27 (2009).

1442

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1419

And limits on attorney’s fee awards mean petitioners generally
must individually pay according to an hourly rate, a fee-forservices arrangement, or a contingency agreement for years
before they reach a federal court.112 Finally, even when parties
retain counsel over the years it may take to exhaust their administrative remedies, consolidation under the existing Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure is incredibly rare. The few common
claims with counsel almost never reach appellate courts at the
same time.113 In March 2020, for example, only 347 administrative claims were consolidated on appeal across the entire federal
appellate docket.114
The class action was developed to permit unsophisticated
parties to band together to bring small claims when they otherwise lack counsel, resources, or certainty that the government
will be able to adhere to a court order.115 This may be particularly
valuable when the government cannot assure that it will comply
with precedent.116 Claimants can rely on class counsel and do not
have to seek separate legal representation to protect their rights
in subsequent proceedings.117 And, by uniformly resolving
112 The Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified
in scattered sections of the U.S. Code), for example, requires agencies to pay attorneys’
fees and other expenses of “prevailing” parties in “adversary” adjudications, but not when
an agency is “substantially justified or [ ] special circumstances make an award unjust.”
28 U.S.C. § 2412. In some government programs, those fees are sharply limited until after
parties have exhausted several levels of administrative appeals. Attorney’s fee awards in
all of 2019 included: 8,223 for Social Security claims, 41 for claims against the Department
of Homeland Security, and 22 for claims against the Department of Interior, the overwhelming number of which were not awarded until after parties reached federal court. See
ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AWARDS REPORT TO
CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 2019 4 (2020).
113 Cf. Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the
Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 815
(1990) (“[P]arties before the agency that can and do appeal to court must wait until they
have exhausted administrative and judicial proceedings before they can receive the benefit
of the circuit’s law.”).
114 U.S. COURTS, FED. JUD. CASELOAD STATS., TABLE B-1, U.S. CTS. OF APPS.—CASES
COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING, BY CIR. AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING, DURING
THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2020 (2020).
115 See Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402–03 (noting that class actions provide “economical
means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and . . . the spreading of litigation costs among
numerous litigants with similar claims”); see also Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia,
5 DUKE L.J. 843, 859–60 (2016).
116 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:35 (collecting cases finding class certification
when “the defendants have not formally committed to granting class-wide relief or taken
any concrete steps to address the plaintiffs’ concerns” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
117 See Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans’ Admin., 118 F.R.D. 113, 119 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“Class
actions enable unidentified class members to enforce court orders with contempt proceedings, rather than relying on the res judicata in a subsequent lawsuit.”).
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common questions in a single proceeding, class actions can even
reduce government expenses—improving efficiency and consistency for parties challenging the same government practice.
3. Record development and piecemeal relief.
Individual parties also may not be able to construct the record needed for courts to craft effective relief. For example, an
agency may fail to provide interpreters, record evidence, or collect
other information needed to facilitate judicial review.118 Absent
some procedure that can pool information about a government
policy or practice, appellate courts may simply lack the information they need to determine whether a government agency continues to violate the law.
When the first lawsuits challenging the Department of
Homeland Security’s policy of separating families at border crossings commenced, for example, the parties were able to file a class
action in federal district court, even though the government denied that the policy existed.119 The class action device permitted
parties to pool information and conduct discovery over whether
the government engaged in an unstated government policy that
the court ultimately found unlawful. Had each case proceeded individually, as the government had urged, plaintiffs may have
been hard-pressed to establish a system-wide government practice or to urge the court to provide class discovery needed to help
ensure the government timely reunited those families.120
Individualized decision-making can also lead to piecemeal relief. For example, when agencies “unreasonabl[y] delay” claims
because of systemic understaffing or mismanagement, individual
relief can actually harm other similarly situated parties by moving individual cases ahead of others.121 Resolving the individual
claims may contribute to longer delays for class members who do

118

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991).
See Ms. L. v. U.S Immigr. & Customs Enf’t (“ICE”), 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1139
(S.D. Cal. 2018), modified, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (enjoining the government’s
separation of class members from their children); Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,
415 F. Supp. 3d 980 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (enforcing the injunction in part).
120 Ms. L., 310 F. Supp. at 1145 (finding that circumstances warranted a class-wide
injunction and observing that evidence gathered from class members “confirm[ed] what
the Government has already stated: it is not affirmatively reuniting parents like Plaintiffs
and their fellow class members for purposes other than removal”).
121 See Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (recognizing that
“[g]ranting a mandamus [in an individual delay case] may result in no more than linejumping without resolving the underlying problem of overall delay”).
119
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not bring their own claims.122 Absent a class-wide order that ensures that claims are resolved in a uniformly timely manner,
piecemeal appeals may inevitably favor some individual petitioners over others.123
This is a particular problem in cases alleging government
dysfunction. Following an exposé of the Black Lung Benefits
Program, thousands of coal miners pursued a class action for
fraudulent misconduct against a medical examiner who systematically denied that they had a qualifying disease.124 But no similar class remedy exists to permit those same claimants to get new
hearings in the Black Lung Benefits Program itself. In such cases,
it may be difficult, if not impossible, to provide consistent relief to
discrete groups of people adversely impacted by the same unlawful government practice outside of a class action.125
One could argue that a court could provide the same comprehensive relief using other tools, like a mandatory writ or injunctive relief, without a class action.126 Some courts have rejected
122 Id. (“[A] judicial order putting [petitioner] at the head of the queue simply moves
all others back one space and produces no net gain” (second alteration in original) (quoting
In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991))).
123 See id. at 1039–40 (endorsing class-wide relief over individual relief when veterans
allege delays in the adjudication of their cases); Barnett v. Bowen, 665 F. Supp. 1096, 1099
(D. Vt. 1987) (concluding that a class action is “essential” to ensuring that all claims for
Social Security disability benefits are decided in a uniformly timely manner).
124 Chris Hamby, Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against Johns Hopkins Hospital over
Black Lung Program, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/234F
-C9S5.
125 By contrast, a federal district court in Connecticut recently certified a class of veterans who claimed the Navy Discharge Review Board failed to upgrade their discharges
at rates three times less than the Air Force because of systemic bias against soldiers with
Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome. Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110, 115, 123 (D. Conn.
2018). In another case, the Social Security Administration recently settled a class action
that requires it to give claimants evaluated by the same biased consulting physician a
chance to seek their benefits again. Plaintiffs’ Motion & Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Agreement at 4,
Hart v. Colvin, 310 F.R.D. 427 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:15-cv-00623-JST).
126 This is roughly the position taken by the Principles of the Law of Aggregate
Litigation. Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 2.04 cmt. A, at 117–19 (Am.
Law Inst. 2010) (“[T]he generally applicable nature of the policy or practice typically
means that the defendant government will be in a position, as a practical matter, either
to maintain or to discontinue the disputed policy or practice as a whole, not to afford relief
therefrom only to the named [plaintiff].”); see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class
Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1433 (2003) (“[W]hen the named plaintiff seeks
an injunction, as in the typical school desegregation case, it is not even clear what is to be
gained for him or the class by casting the suit in terms of a class action.”). It is true that
when plaintiffs target a general “policy or practice” in government litigation, the government body “[may] be in a position” to apply the same rule to everyone. Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, supra, at 117. But that result is hardly assured. As
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class action challenges to government actions under the
Administrative Procedure Act, precisely because they found it unnecessary to certify a class when they could just as easily enjoin
a system-wide government policy without one.127
But assume a party knows their legal rights, finds counsel,
and maintains a live “controversy” so that an appellate court can
grant some relief. Class actions still offer other benefits for parties and courts that cannot be provided by injunctive relief alone.
First, a growing debate questions whether courts can enjoin the
federal government against nonparties.128 This is, in part, because
litigants generally cannot seek remedies broader than necessary
to resolve the harm that an individual litigant herself experiences.129 But no one contests that class action can broaden the
scope of a remedy to all members of a class or hone it down according to their differences in distinct subclasses.130
Second, class actions provide an important adversarial tool to
ensure compliance after the court issues a decision.131 This is particularly true for far-flung plaintiffs challenging opaque practices
administered by many different officers in a government

illustrated here, class actions offer another tool to combat bureaucratic drift, mismanagement, delay, and obstacles to legal outreach and representation before and after a court
order.
127 See, e.g., McDonald v. McLucas, 371 F. Supp. 831, 833–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding
that “the constitutionality of [the statutes at issue] can be raised and determined in an
action for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief without the necessity of a class
action”); Sepulveda v. Block, No. 84 Civ. 1448 (MJL), 1985 WL 1095, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
26, 1985), aff’d, 782 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting the Secretary of Agriculture’s argument that “class certification is not necessary” because “as a government official the relief
sought by the named plaintiffs would benefit the proposed class”).
128 Compare, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really
“Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335,
375 (2018), and Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction,
131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 464–65 (2017), and Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions,
Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 629–34
(2017), with Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 HARV. L. REV.
920, 993–1007 (2020), and Alan M. Trammell, Demystifying Nationwide Injunctions, 98
TEX. L. REV. 67, 90 (2019), and Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion,
118 MICH. L. REV. 1, 38–39 (2019), and Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1090 (2018).
129 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 246–47
(3d ed. 2002).
130 See Bray, supra note 128, at 475 (discussing class actions as the appropriate vehicle when injunctive relief for individual plaintiffs may be too narrow).
131 See Almendares v. Palmer, 222 F.R.D. 324, 334 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (certifying a class
of plaintiffs seeking bilingual services in food-stamp program because, inter alia, it is “not
clear that any injunctive relief awarded to an individual plaintiff will automatically inure
to the benefit of the class as a whole”); see also Nehmer, 118 F.R.D. at 119–20.
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bureaucracy.132 Without class counsel available to interpret and
enforce a new judicial decision before the agency, the court’s mandate may be misinterpreted or ignored.
4. Congressional design.
Class actions in appellate courts, in this sense, are not inconsistent with congressional design. That is, the legislative history,
purpose, and structure of many appellate review schemes show
that class actions reflect what Congress often wants: to expedite
big government challenges in the federal appellate courts without
denying those same courts the tools to ensure that the executive
branch complies with the law.133
Many statutes that streamline government litigation into appellate courts express Congress’s hope that courts will articulate
the boundaries of federal law and guide public and private actors
in the future. Consider, for example, the legislative history of
many of the early models for channeling statutes that culminated
in the Administrative Orders Review Act of 1950134 (AORA)
(which still requires exclusive appellate review of many government programs today). The authors of the AORA hoped to reduce
direct appeals to the Supreme Court.135 But the bill’s drafters also
believed that litigants deserved an “appeal as of right in some appellate court” consistent with the “traditional” process to decide
law.136

132 Nicholas R. Parillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 691–92 (2018) (finding
“contempt motions have been made (or contempt proceedings have been otherwise initiated) against federal agencies or officials about once a week nationwide” in the last few
decades for failing to comply with judicial decisions).
133 Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942) (observing that if Congress
had to itemize every judicial procedure and remedy, it would “stultify the purpose of Congress
to utilize the courts as a means for vindicating the public interest”); Califano v. Yamasaki,
442 U.S. 682, 699–701 (1979) (observing that in light of broad power Congress gives to
courts to manage their own procedures, the statute lacked “the necessary clear expression
of congressional intent” to prohibit class actions).
134 Pub. L. No. 81-901, 64 Stat. 1129 (1950) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2352).
135 Sigalos, supra note 76, at 1103–04, 1103 n.40 (discussing Chief Justice Harlan
Stone’s hope of reducing the Supreme Court’s caseload).
136 Providing for the Review of Orders of Certain Agencies, and Incorporating into the
Judicial Code Certain Statutes Relating to Three-Judge District Courts: Hearing on H.R.
1468, H.R. 1470, and H.R. 2271 Before Subcomm. No. 3 and Subcomm. No. 4 of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 27 (1947) (statement of Hon. Phillips); see also Sigalos,
supra note 76, at 1103–04, 1104 n.47 (observing that the law’s drafters modeled appellate
review after the National Labor Relations Act and the Bituminous Coal Act, which all
included exclusive appellate review provisions).
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Congress has sometimes expressly said that appellate courts
should use flexible consolidation procedures to perform that function. By channeling tens of thousands of veterans’ claims into a
federal appellate court, for example, Congress hoped to promote
the same kinds of systemic challenges that are available in federal district court, even observing that “most challenges to regulations are class actions.”137 Legislators had similar hopes that review of some Department of Labor programs would permit
appellate courts to consolidate and resolve systemic legal challenges more effectively and quickly.138
But even when Congress does not explicitly say what kinds
of procedural rules federal courts should use to resolve claims—
which is very often—courts enjoy broad authority to develop rules
to manage the cases that come before them.139 For that reason,
courts require a “clear expression of congressional intent” before
finding that Congress meant to bar certain court procedures, especially class actions.140 Notably, Congress has not come close to
doing so in most channeling statutes. Out of the nearly two hundred channeling statutes reviewed here, only one expressly prevents courts from hearing class actions.141
137 H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 1, at 41–42 (1988); Monk, 855 F.3d at 1320 n.4 (observing that the “Congressional Budget Office cost estimate released shortly before the [statute creating appellate jurisdiction] was enacted suggests that Congress intended that the
Veterans Court would have the authority to maintain class actions”).
138 Hearings on H.R. 1362 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1084–85 (1945).
139 See, e.g., In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1897) (“The general rule undoubtedly
is that courts of justice possess the inherent power to make and frame reasonable rules
not conflicting with express statute.”); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 98 (1861) (“[I]n
all cases where original jurisdiction is given by the Constitution, this court has authority
to exercise it without any further act of Congress to regulate its process . . . .”).
140 See, e.g., Califano, 442 U.S. at 700 (holding that the statute lacked “the necessary
clear expression of congressional intent” to prohibit class actions).
141 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (“[N]o court may . . . certify a class under Rule 23.”).
In June 2022, the Supreme Court arguably raised new questions about the durability of
this “clear statement” doctrine in Aleman Gonzalez. In Aleman Gonzalez, the Supreme
Court decided that another provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which
did not expressly foreclose class actions, still barred class-wide injunctive relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and perhaps even more traditional forms of joinder. Garland
v. Aleman Gonzales, 142 S. Ct. 2057, 2068 (2022) (observing, without deciding, that a “literal reading [of § 1252(f)] . . . could rule out efforts to obtain any injunctive relief that
applies to multiple named plaintiffs (or perhaps even rule out injunctive relief in a lawsuit
brought by multiple named plaintiffs)”). But a better reading of Aleman Gonzalez is that
the doctrine retains its vitality. The Court stressed that cases supporting the doctrine, like
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), were “quite different” because the applicable
section of the INA was expressly designed to limit judicial review and injunctive relief. See
Aleman Gonzales, 142 S. Ct. at 2068 (distinguishing Califano and suggesting that
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Class actions are also consistent with appellate courts’ role in
the U.S. judicial hierarchy: to develop the law. By channeling disputes into appellate courts, Congress has chosen a forum designed to give content to federal law and ensure that the executive
branch complies with it. If Congress only wrote channeling statutes to bring a quick end to private disputes, Congress could just
as easily require that parties file petitions in a federal district
court with no opportunity to appeal.142 Channeling review ensures
that appellate courts, with the power to authoritatively and coherently interpret law, do so for the government bodies that operate in the broad geographic regions they oversee.143 Class actions further that goal by enabling courts to maintain jurisdiction
over large numbers of small, transient, or intangible claims that
would otherwise evade judicial review.
To be sure, class actions raise some structural concerns for
appellate courts, but they should not be overstated. First, although
parties would not have the same number of opportunities to appeal a class action decision as they would if it began in a federal
district court, en banc panels of circuit judges and the Supreme
Court would often exercise virtually the same discretion to review
an appellate court class action as an appellate court would when
reviewing a district court class action decision.144 Second, while
§ 1252(f) “simply uses different language” from § 1252(e) to “bar class-wide injunctive relief and extends no further.”) In contrast, the vast majority of appellate judicial review
statutes enable direct appellate review and do not contain limitations on injunctive relief.
See Appendix A; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul
Carrington's "Substance"' and "Procedure"' in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1012, 1044–45 (1989) (“If, as the Supreme Court has assured us, Congress legislates
against the background of Federal Rules and does not lightly seek their displacement,
there should be very few statutory provisions remaining that are inconsistent with Federal
Rules.”)
142 See, e.g., REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, 119 Stat. 306 (2005) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 102(c)) (foreclosing appellate court review of DHS waivers designed to “ensure expeditious construction” of the U.S. border wall with Mexico); Currie &
Goodman, supra note 22, at 9 (observing that the “more significant advantage of singletier district court review is the conservation of judicial resources”).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 63–69.
144 See In re BancorpSouth, Inc., No. 16-0505, 2016 WL 5714755, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept.
6, 2016) (comparing the “unfettered” discretion to review a district court class action decision to the “discretion of the Supreme Court in considering whether to grant certiorari”);
3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:41 (observing appellate courts have “unfettered discretion [about] whether to permit the appeal” of a lower district court’s class action decision).
To be sure, there are some differences between en banc review and traditional appellate
review of class actions. First, en banc review normally does not exist to correct errors the
way that traditional appellate review does. See RULES AND INTERNAL OPERATING
PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 34 (2020)
(noting that en banc review “is an extraordinary procedure that is intended to bring to the
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class actions theoretically could increase the dockets of appellate
courts, filing rates in the appellate courts that use them suggest
they do not meaningfully add to their overall caseload. 145 Third,
appellate courts, which often sit in rotating panels to decide important legal questions, may not manage parties as efficiently as
a single judge. But randomly assigned, three-judge district court
panels do hear federal legal challenges, often relying on class actions to do so.146 And historically, policymakers trusted and preferred three-judge courts for quick resolution of important, pressing national questions, much like when Congress assigns
government challenges to federal appellate courts.147
One final concern—the extent to which appellate courts can
resolve factual questions to hear a class action—is discussed in
more depth in Part III.A. But, for now, it is important to note that
although this question raises the question of which class actions
federal appellate courts can hear—as well as how they may hear
them—limits on appellate fact-finding need not be seen as a
attention of the entire court an error of exceptional importance” (emphasis added)). However, en banc review exists largely (if not entirely) to develop the law and ensure uniformity, FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (framing en banc review as appropriate to “secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” or if “the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance”), which would not be very different from en banc review of most
class appeals, which will involve many cases across the administrative system. See infra
Part III.B. Moreover, parties in district courts normally have a right to appellate review
of a class-certification decision if they litigate to a final judgment, which is not the same
as discretionary en banc review. However, to the extent that appellate panels work much
like three-judge district court panels, see infra Part III.B, they both often have the last
word in important government litigation on the existence of any errors.
145 In the past three years, parties have filed a total of twenty-two class actions out of
the annual 6,800-case docket heard by the nine judges on the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims. That docket almost equals the administrative caseload for all 179 judges
on all thirteen federal appellate courts combined. See U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS FED. JUD. CASELOAD STATS. (2021), https://perma.cc/4EHT-LHFA (highlighting
7,147 appeals commenced from government agencies last year); see also infra Part II.B–C.
146 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947–48 (2011) (affirming class action
decision issued by a three-judge panel). See generally Brown v. Board of Ed.¸98 F. Supp.
797 (D. Kan. 1951) (class action before three-judge court), rev’d, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147 See Stephen I. Vladeck, F.D.R.’s Court-Packing Plan Had Two Parts. We Need to
Bring Back the Second, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/X4SB-KLRV (arguing
that three-judge panels “reduce the cherry-picking of outlier judges”; produce “more consistent decision making”; and offer “a more efficient path to full merits review by the
Supreme Court”); Michael T. Morley, Vertical Stare Decisis and Three-Judge District
Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 699, 727–38 (2020); Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 124–25 (2014); David
P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 7 n.40 (1964) (“I am opposed to allowing one little federal judge to stand up against the
governor and the legislature and the attorney general of the State and say, ‘This act is
unconstitutional.’” (quoting 45 Cong. Rec. 7256 (1910) (statement of Sen. Overman))).
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barrier to whether appellate courts hear class actions at all. After
all, government cases are traditionally channeled into appellate
courts because they presumably involve legal questions that will
not turn on difficult factual determinations. And when factual
questions do materialize, federal appellate courts have the power
to retain jurisdiction and remand those questions to district court
judges, special masters, and administrative agencies.
Finally, all courts that review agencies—whether they are
called “district” or “appellate” courts—ultimately perform similar
functions: they deferentially review an agency’s findings of fact to
determine if they are supported by the evidence, reasonably explained, and lawful.148 The Judicial Conference, for example, is
currently considering whether federal district courts should adopt
new rules modeled after the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
to resolve large numbers of social security cases.149 But those rules
specifically permit class actions, so parties may continue to challenge the “constitutionality or validity of statutory and regulatory
requirements, or [make] similar broad challenges to agency policies and procedures.”150
It may seem strange to conclude that class actions are consistent with a congressional scheme that assigned cases to courts
that lack explicit rules for them. But the Supreme Court has long
recognized that courts can flexibly manage the cases that come
before them, much like other “agencies of government.”151 The
148 See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the
Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 952–63 (2011)
(describing the emergence of an “appellate” review model of agency action); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Confessions of an Administrative Law Pollyanna, YALE J. ON REG. (Jan. 16,
2018), https://perma.cc/R28B-JGEM.
149 Supreme Court of the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil
Procedure
(Apr.
11,
2022)
[hereinafter
Proposed
Amendments],
https://perma.cc/75ES-ZE29. As a report from ACUS observed, Social Security cases make
up 7% of federal district courts’ dockets, generating far “more litigation for district courts
than any other type of appeal from a federal administrative agency.” ADMIN. CONF. OF THE
U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2016-3: SPECIAL PROCEDURAL
RULES FOR SOCIAL SECURITY LITIGATION IN DISTRICT COURT 2 (2016) [hereinafter ACUS,
Recommendation 2016-3].
150 ACUS, Recommendation 2016-3, supra note 149, at 7; see also id. at 8. (“These
rules would not apply to class actions or to other cases that are outside the scope of the
rationale for the proposal.”; Proposed Amendments, supra note 149, at 3; (“These rules
govern [the review of social security cases] that present[ ] only an individual claim.”).
151 Scripps-Howard Radio, 316 U.S. at 15; see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Other
Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 405, 408 (2008) (“Congress delegates authority not only to agencies, but to courts as
well.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty,
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1039–41 (2006).
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same is true for the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.152 The
idea that courts enjoy procedural powers unless the law says they
do not is grounded in similar structural concerns about the expertise, incremental decision-making, and decisional independence
we expect from our courts.153 Courts enjoy more expertise than
Congress at crafting procedural rules for managing cases that
come before them. Courts sit in a better position, after the fact, to
incrementally adjust procedures based on how people respond to
the new substantive rights and responsibilities that Congress creates.154 And, as a separate branch of government, Congress presumably values the judiciary’s independent ability to create procedural rules to manage its own affairs and interpret the law.
As set forth below, affording appellate courts the limited jurisdiction to entertain class actions in extraordinary cases under
the All Writs Act is consistent with this same goal: permitting
direct appeals so that appellate courts can develop expertise and
reduce uncertainty, while giving those same courts the flexibility
to hear and resolve classes of similar claims that otherwise might
escape judicial resolution.
II. AUTHORITY UNDER THE ALL WRITS ACT AND PROCEDURAL
EXPERIMENTATION
As it happens, appellate courts already enjoy limited authority to fashion procedures, including class actions, under the All
Writs Act. The All Writs Act permits federal courts to issue “all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”155

152 See FED. R. APP. P. 47 (stating that, in cases not provided for by rule, courts of
appeals may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with legislation and
appellate rules); UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 211 (1965) (permitting intervention in a court of appeals by the prevailing party before an agency despite the absence
of a uniform federal appellate rule authorizing intervention).
153 See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 841 (2008)
(“Even apart from expertise, which does not itself confer power, the federal courts have a
stronger claim to constitutional authority in matters of procedure than in matters of
substance.”).
154 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939):

The jurisdiction to review the orders of the [agency] is vested in a court with
equity powers, and while the court must act within the bounds of the statute and
without intruding upon the administrative province, it may adjust its relief to
the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable principles governing
judicial action.
155

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
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Courts have long relied on the All Writs Act to develop procedures to fill in gaps of authority and flexibly resolve new disputes.
The All Writs Act provides courts with the power to resolve issues
that may ordinarily escape detection or judicial resolution. For
that reason, it even extends to writs in aid of a court’s prospective
jurisdiction—that is, over claims not yet before the court but
pending in an administrative agency or lower court.156
Using their powers over agencies and courts, appellate courts
have fashioned remedies designed to provide relief to large groups
of people. Appellate courts have also developed procedural rules
to review systemic government misconduct—most notably in the
context of habeas and veterans class actions—without a specific
rule to do so.
A. Appellate Supervision of Courts and Agencies Under the All
Writs Act
Appellate courts have long used their power under the All
Writs Act to protect their jurisdiction and correct systemic errors.
For example, in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,157 the Supreme
Court approved the Seventh Circuit’s writ against a persistent
practice in the Northern District of Illinois of routinely referring
cases to magistrates without a jury trial.158 After spending years
individually admonishing trial judges for overusing special masters, the Seventh Circuit relied on the All Writs Act to vacate
those referrals.159 The Court squarely rejected the dissent’s argument that courts could not issue writs against systemic problems
that had yet to reach the Seventh Circuit.160 Instead, the Supreme
Court held that the Seventh Circuit’s action was appropriate to
protect its future jurisdiction over those cases, to uniformly

156 See, e.g., McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 280 (1910) (“[W]here a case is within
the appellate jurisdiction of the higher court[,] a writ of mandamus may issue in aid of the
appellate jurisdiction which might otherwise be defeated by the unauthorized action of the
court below.”); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943) (stating that appellate courts’ authority to issue writs of mandamus “extends to those cases which are within
its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been perfected”); Telecomms. Rsch. &
Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
157 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
158 Id. at 250–60.
159 Id. at 257–58.
160 Id. at 257–60 (rejecting the “conten[tion] that the Seventh Circuit has erroneously
construed the All Writs Act as ‘conferring on it a “roving commission” to supervise interlocutory orders of the District Courts in advance of final decision’”).
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protect the rights of parties, and to conserve judicial resources
associated with more appeals and new trials.161
The La Buy decision dramatically expanded the authority of
federal courts of appeals to issue writs “in aid of” their jurisdiction
under the All Writs Act.162 Up until that point, many believed that
appellate courts’ powers under the All Writs Act were “strictly
auxiliary” to the cases before it.163 Although some prominent
judges later questioned the continued viability of La Buy,164 the
Supreme Court and other courts continue to support the flexible
use of the All Writs Act to prevent repeated errors by courts and
agencies.165
Appellate courts’ authority under the All Writs Act applies
equally to federal agencies.166 Courts have used common law writs
to provide relief from systemic government misconduct since the
eighteenth century.167 Since then, appellate courts have been “amply armed” to provide relief from unlawful government action

161 Id. at 259–60 (“We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the
Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system. The
All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of
mandamus in the exceptional circumstances existing here.”).
162 Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1259
(2007) (“Until La Buy, the authority of federal courts of appeals to direct writs of mandamus to federal trial courts ‘in aid of’ the appellate court’s jurisdiction was very narrow.”);
Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 89, 114 (1975) (describing how La Buy expanded the scope of appellate
mandamus under the All Writs Act).
163 La Buy, 352 U.S. at 263–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases describing
appellate courts’ “strictly auxiliary power” under the All Writs Act).
164 E.g., First Nat’l Bank of Waukesha v. Warren, 796 F.2d 999, 1004–05 (7th Cir.
1986) (Easterbrook, J.) (“LaBuy is defunct.”).
165 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380–82 (2004); Mallard v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1989); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, 16 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3934.1 (3d ed. 2018) (collecting cases).
166 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606–12 (1966); United States v. N.Y. Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171–78 (1977); Michael v. INS, 48 F.3d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that the All Writs Act authorizes courts to enter stays of removal in aid of their prospective
jurisdiction); Kyei v. INS, 65 F.3d 279, 281–82 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming All Writs Act authority but denying a stay of removal on the facts of the case); Cleveland v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 561 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1977); ILGWU v. Donovan, 733 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (per curium); Am. Trucking Ass’n v. ICC, 669 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1982)
(“Litigation in scores of cases is not [sic] adequate remedy for an agency’s failure to carry
out its statutory duties. Therefore, there is no adequate alternative remedy.”).
167 James E. Pfander & Jacob Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young,
72 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1296–1306, 1309–11 (2020) (describing the evolution of common
law writs in England and the United States to police government action); see also JAFFE,
supra note 62, at 176 (describing the use of writs of certiorari and mandamus as “the twin
pillars of the common law of judicial control”).
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under the All Writs Act.168 “These principles, so familiar in operation within the hierarchy of judicial benches, indulge no exception for reviews of administrative agencies.”169
In the past, some appellate courts have used mandatory writs
much like class actions, ordering agencies adjudicating thousands
of claims to change their unlawful programs in one fell swoop.
After unions, shippers, and businesses sued the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for illegally processing thousands of licenses, the Fifth Circuit ordered the ICC to revamp its regulations for all shippers to stave off “the potential for massive future
litigation.”170 The court underscored the importance of providing
uniform relief to a mass adjudication system through a writ of
mandamus: “The volume of matters the ICC is handling is so
great,” the court observed, that “applicants, opponents, and the
public, as well as the Commission, should know with certainty the
terms of our opinion and enforcing mandate.”171
But appellate courts’ ability to fix problems under the All
Writs Act still has its limits. The Supreme Court has said that
appellate courts cannot use the All Writs Act when a specific statute already “addresses the particular issue at hand.”172 Litigants,
for example, cannot invoke the All Writs Act to remove state cases
to federal court because a federal removal statute already governs
that process.173
Additionally, plaintiffs may need a class action to ensure that
the government does not frustrate their claims before courts effectuate relief for large groups of people. The Supreme Court, for
example, recently rejected the Ninth Circuit’s efforts to end pretrial shackling of criminal defendants in San Diego federal
court.174 The Ninth Circuit had ruled that it could still enjoin the
practice, even after the petitioners were released, because the inherently transitory nature of the pretrial practice meant that the
Ninth Circuit might not receive another opportunity to review
168

Cleveland, 561 F.2d at 346 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Id.
170 American Trucking Ass’n, 669 F.2d at 961; see also id. (“Litigation in scores of
cases is not adequate remedy for an agency’s failure to carry out its statutory duties.
Therefore, there is no adequate alternative remedy.”)
171 Id.
172 Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting Pa. Bureau
of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985)). But see Steinman, supra note 162,
at 1285 (emphasis in original) (“[T]he All Writs Act is precisely designed for circumstances
where more specific statutes do not provide for the necessary remedy.”).
173 Syngenta Crop Prot., 537 U.S. at 31.
174 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1539–40 (2018).
169
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it.175 The Supreme Court reversed. It reasoned that the petitioners’ claims had become moot upon release. Absent a class action
on behalf of plaintiffs subject to the ongoing practice, no live claim
existed for the Ninth Circuit to resolve.176
However, as explained below, the All Writs Act also permits
courts to develop procedures where none exist “in aid of” their jurisdiction, including class action rules that prevent the government from selectively mooting claims that challenge the same unlawful policy.
B. Appellate Use of Class Actions Under the All Writs Act
The All Writs Act also includes the power to craft innovative
procedures to protect a court’s jurisdiction. In other words, the
writ offers a “legislatively approved source of procedural instruments” not confined to “the precise forms of that writ in vogue at
the common law or in the English judicial system.”177 In light of
the need to protect their jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held
it is “essential not to limit appellate courts to the ordinary forms
and purposes of legal process.”178 Appellate courts may thus “fashion appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules
or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage” under the All
Writs Act.179
Since the 1970s, appellate courts have held that this power
includes the ability to fashion class action–like rules in habeas
cases, even in the absence of an express rule to do so. In United
States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser,180 for example, the Second Circuit
held that courts enjoyed the power to hear habeas class actions
against government institutions “by analogy” to Rule 23 of the

175 United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 659 (9th Cir. 2017) (reasoning
that, because pretrial shackling is “inherently ephemeral,” a court of appeals “[i]n its supervisory mandamus role” can enjoin harm from a “policy affecting a huge class of persons
who aren’t parties to the mandamus petition”).
176 Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1539–40.
177 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1944); see also United States v. Catoggio, 698
F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (“The broad power conferred by the All Writs Act is aimed at
achieving ‘the rational ends of law,’” and “[t]hus, courts have significant flexibility in exercising their authority under the Act.”); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1203
(9th Cir. 1975) (“The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the
initiative and flexibility essential to insure [sic] that miscarriages of justice within its
reach are surfaced and corrected.”).
178 Price, 334 U.S. at 283; see also Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43 (“[The All Writs]
Act empowers federal courts to fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises.”).
179 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969).
180 506 F.2d 1115 (2d Cir. 1974).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.181 The Court believed that aggregating the claims was necessary because petitioners lacked access to counsel, underscoring the inefficiency of “hearing and deciding numerous individual petitions.”182 Finding that the
petitioners met all of the standard criteria under the modern class
action rule, the court found a “compelling justification” under the
“unusual circumstances” of the case to permit a “multi-party
proceeding.”183
The Supreme Court has highlighted the importance of habeas
classes to allow courts to review live constitutional claims against
government entities. In United States Parole Commissioner v.
Geraghty184—a habeas class action that challenged the U.S. Parole
Board’s new guidelines for release—the Supreme Court found
that the petitioner still retained an independent “personal stake”
in representing the class after his release.185 In so holding, the
Court recognized that the class was necessary to protect the
court’s own jurisdiction, noting that many claims would be “so inherently transitory” that a court might not reach a class certification motion “before the proposed representative’s [ ] interest expires.”186 Although the Supreme Court has never squarely decided
the viability of habeas class actions, circuit courts continue to allow them to preserve courts’ jurisdiction in situations where the
executive branch effectively controls whether the case will expire
before judgment.187
Most recently, building on the history of the use of habeas
class actions, the Federal Circuit ruled that an appellate court
could hear class actions in aid of its jurisdiction under the All
Writs Act.188 The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
which exclusively reviews veterans’ benefit decisions, was
181

Id. at 1125 (quoting Harris, 394 U.S. at 299) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1126 (citation omitted).
183 Id. at 1125.
184 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
185 Id. at 404 (reasoning that “vigorous advocacy can be assured through means other
than . . . a ‘personal stake in the outcome’” and that the respondent “continues vigorously
to advocate his right to have a class certified”).
186 Id. at 399.
187 See, e.g., Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying Rule 23’s
requirements to a representative habeas action), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Schall
v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); United States ex. rel. Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 221
(7th Cir. 1975) (same); Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1121–26 (9th Cir. 2009) (same);
Napier v. Gertrude, 542 F.2d 825, 827 n.2 (10th Cir. 1976) (same); Solomon v. Zenk,
No. 04-CV-2214, 2004 WL 2370651, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004) (same); Kazarov v.
Achim, No. 02 C 5097, 2003 WL 22956006, at *3 & n.8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2003) (same).
188 Monk v. Shulkin, 855 F.3d 1312, 1318–21 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
182
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modeled after other federal appellate courts that exclusively review large administrative adjudication programs described
here.189 Although an Article I court, the appellate court enjoys all
of the same powers as any other federal court of appeals under
the All Writs Act and hears a tremendous number of appeals.190
In 2018, it received 6,802 appeals, which was more than the number of appeals from federal agencies filed in every Article III circuit court that year combined.191 Nevertheless, shortly after it was
created, the court summarily concluded that it lacked the authority to hear or manage class actions and that, as an appellate court,
it could better address repeat problems with binding precedential
decisions.192
The Federal Circuit recently overturned that decision in
Monk v. Shulkin,193 holding that the court of appeals could hear
class actions under the All Writs Act.194 The court reasoned that,
without a class action device, the government could routinely
avoid litigation that would impact large groups of unrepresented
veterans by selectively mooting their claims.195 The class action,
according to the Federal Circuit, ensured that the court of appeals
would continue to perform the role that Congress imagined: acting “as lawgiver and error corrector simultaneously, while also
reducing delays associated with individual appeals.”196 The procedural flexibility of the All Writs Act to hear class actions also promoted “efficiency, consistency, and fairness, and improv[ed]

189 See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (describing the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims).
190 See Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“By its express terms, the
[All Writs Act] unambiguously applies to ‘all courts established by Act of Congress.’ The
Court of Veterans Appeals is such a court.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1994))); Bates v.
Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming that the All Writs Act applies
to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).
191 Compare ROBERT N. DAVIS, STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT N. DAVIS,
CHIEF JUDGE, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS FOR SUBMISSION TO THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
ON THE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, VETERANS
AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES 6 (2018), with U.S. Courts Administrative Office,
TableB-5—U.S. Courts of Appeals Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31, 2018).
192 Lefkowitz v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 439, 440 (1991) (per curiam).
193 855 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
194 Id. at 1318 (“We see no limitation in the All Writs Act precluding it from forming
the authoritative basis to entertain a class action.”).
195 Id. at 1321 (observing that “[c]ase law is replete with such examples”).
196 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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access to legal and expert assistance by parties with limited resources.”197
Since the Monk decision in 2017, veterans’ legal organizations and other plaintiffs have brought more than twenty appellate class actions against the Department of Veterans Affairs, and
the court has certified three of them.198 Many challenge the same
kinds of delays, procedural barriers, and systemic problems described Part I.B—challenges that, up until then, people had not
been able to commence in appellate courts. They include: (1) unfair notice provisions,199 (2) procedural barriers to obtaining claim
forms,200 (3) unlawful rating decisions,201 (4) wrongful denials of
emergency medical reimbursement,202 and (5) refusals to adjudicate caregiving claims under federal law.203 Although these cases
still comprise a small percentage of the court of appeals’ total
docket, they paint a stark portrait of the dangers of channeling
cases into appellate courts without the tools to aggregate and address them. Many of these cases raise longstanding issues that
have gone unaddressed for years, even decades—from unexplained ministerial delays204 to toxic exposures that date back to
the 1960s.205
This is not to say that class actions under the All Writs Act
are a panacea, and particularly not for institutional reform cases
that require intense factual development. Courts typically only
grant relief under the All Writs Act to protect “clear and indisputable” rights or answer “important” and “undecided” questions

197

Id. at 1320.
Wolfe v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 1, 23–24 (2019); Godsey v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207,
225 (2019); Skaar v. Wilkie [hereinafter Skaar I], 32 Vet. App. 156, 201 (2019). Ten have
been dismissed on various grounds outlined below. As of July 13, 2022, nine classes remain
pending and are listed on the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims website. See Active
Panel, Stayed, and Class Action Cases, U.S. CT. OF APPS. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS (Mar. 22,
2022), https://perma.cc/B89F-MDWV.
199 Rosinski v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 183, 185 (2018).
200 Request for Class Certification and Class Action at 1, Murray v. McDonough, Vet.
App. No. 21-947 (Feb. 9, 2021).
201 Ward v. Wilkie, No. 16-2157, 2018 WL 6314662, at *1 (Vet. App. Dec. 4, 2018) (assessing a class consisting of “veterans who are or will be subject to an unlawfully stringent
standard for compensation based on aggravation of a secondary disability” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)).
202 Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 23.
203 Beaudette v. McDonough, 34 Vet. App. 95, 100–01 (2021).
204 Monk v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 167, 179 (2018); Godsey, 31 Vet. App. at 214.
205 See Skaar I, 31 Vet. App. at 17–18.
198
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that are likely to recur.206 As a result, some classes routinely
granted in federal district courts may not be available to appellate
courts under this procedure.207 Nevertheless, class actions offer a
critical tool for many of the problems described here: large numbers of related claims that never reach appellate courts because
of systemic government delays, procedural deficiencies, or
dysfunction.
In this way, appellate class actions serve a different role than
class actions in administrative agencies. Administrative class actions, I’ve argued, can give agencies a necessary “first bite” at
hearing large numbers of similar cases efficiently, uniformly, and
consistently with their expertise.208 Instead, appellate class actions, at their core, protect a court’s power to hear cases, interpret
law, and afford relief, when the government’s systemic actions
otherwise frustrate judicial review.
C. Class Actions at the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims
This Section takes a first look at nascent experiments with
appellate classes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
incremental approach to hearing class actions offers insights into
how other appellate courts can exercise their authority to do the
same. These experiments have helped the court forge new rules
to determine appropriate cases for class certification, develop
facts, identify class members, and hone tools to effectuate judicial
relief.
A class action, like other procedures under the All Writs Act,
requires that an individual file a petition with an appellate court
asking for a “representative” or “class” proceeding. It can involve
any person wronged by a government body—including those who
206 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394,
403 (1976)) (granting mandamus for “clear and indisputable” rights); Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (granting mandamus review of a “basic undecided question”); United States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding that mandamus is
available in cases where there is an unsettled issue of law “of substantial public importance,” where the issue is “likely to recur,” and where “deferral of review would potentially impair the opportunity for effective review or relief later on” (citing United States v.
Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769–70 (1st Cir.1994))).
207 See Skaar v. Wilkie [hereinafter Skaar II], 32 Vet. App. 156, 195–96 (observing
that the “unique nature [of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims] requires considerations beyond those applicable to district courts” and that “class actions before this Court
are the exception, not the rule”).
208 The Agency Class Action, supra note 26, at 2053.

1460

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1419

haven’t yet filed an appeal—so long as that person has taken
some “first preliminary step” that might lead to a future appeal.209
But, in several of its first class actions, the court reached out even
further, actively encouraging amicus briefing from veterans’ organizations, legal clinics, and class action scholars about what
portions of the traditional rules for class actions could be adopted
for an appellate court.210 The court then decided several cases that
confronted technical questions about the use of class actions in an
appellate court, including requirements for adequately representing the class211 and the kinds of common issues that warrant class
treatment.212 In cases where the court has certified a class, the
court has then ordered the agency to identify class members, to
209 Mylan Lab’ys. Ltd. v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V., 989 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2021). Courts have concluded that when an agency’s actions threaten a court’s prospective
jurisdiction to hear new cases, a class action under the All Writs Act may include people
at different stages of the appellate process. Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 23 (“A court may use
this [All Writs Act] power ‘where an appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected.’” (quoting FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603–04 (1966))).
210 Rosinski, 2017 WL 2938576, at *1 (inviting amicus briefing in an order); Monk,
2017 WL 4861820 (inviting amicus briefing in an unpublished opinion). In the interest of
full disclosure, I note that I authored several amicus briefs on behalf of law professors of
civil procedure, administrative law, and federal courts in both cases. See generally Amicus
Brief of Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and Federal Courts Professors, Rosinski v.
Shulkin, Vet. App. No. 17-1117, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Aug. 10, 2017,
https://perma.cc/P4WU-9ZGW; Amicus Brief of Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and
Federal Courts Professors in Monk v. Shulkin, Vet. App. No. 15-1280, U.S. Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, Amicus Brief of Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, and
Federal Courts Law Professors, February 8, 2018, https://perma.cc/6URT-VD2X.
211 The court has required that parties have counsel to commence a class action—an
unsurprising decision, except for the fact that the vast majority of veterans filing claims
have historically filed pro se or with the assistance of Veterans Service Organizations. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 345, 347 (2018) (following other circuit courts rejecting pro se class actions); cf. ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETS. CLAIMS OCT.
1, 2016 TO SEPT. 30, 2017 (FISCAL YEAR 2017) 1–2 (2018) (showing that roughly a third of
petitions and appeals filed with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims are pro se);
ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETS. CLAIMS, OCT. 1, 2015 TO SEPT. 30, 2016
(FISCAL YEAR 2016) 1–2 (2017) (same); ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETS.
CLAIMS, OCT. 1, 2014 TO SEPT. 30, 2015 (FISCAL YEAR 2015) 1–2 (2016) (same).
212 In an en banc decision, the Monk court evenly split—four to four—over whether to
certify a class of all veterans whose claims had been delayed by more than one year. Monk,
30 Vet. App. at 169. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338 (2011), four judges believed the class lacked commonality, pointing to the fact that
parties could not identify a particular policy or practice that “glue[d]” the claims together.
Id. at 175 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 255–60, 352). Four others believed the discrete
legal question, whether a one-year delay was per se unreasonable, could be applied to all
class members. Some opposing certification, however, described how a narrower class
would succeed. Id. at 183 (Davis, C.J., concurring) (“This is not to say that, in a case where
petitioners show that the weights on the balancing-test scales are the same for each class
member, the Court would not certify a class to challenge part of VA’s appellate process.”
(emphasis in original)).
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readjudicate their claims consistent with the relief it ordered, or
to produce status reports so that the court and class counsel could
monitor its progress.213 After three years managing class actions
without them, the court of appeals finally adopted formal rules to
hear class actions on the day before Veterans Day, November 10,
2020. 214
Three class actions influenced the court’s final rule—and
each offers important insights into how other appellate courts can
use similar authority to find facts, navigate precedent, and structure relief. First, the court has remanded some cases to the VA to
determine whether enough facts supported a motion to certify a
class.215 For example, in Skaar v. Wilkie,216 the court of appeals
remanded a class action challenging how the VA measures radiation exposure back to the Board of Veterans Appeals.217 Because
of its own limited fact-finding authority, the court instead gave
the VA ninety days to assess how many plaintiffs were subject to
the VA’s methodology, while retaining jurisdiction over the action.218 Relying on those findings, the court held the lead plaintiffs’
claims were typical of other class members who were denied compensation for radiation exposure and that the class was sizable
enough to warrant class certification.219
Second, the court has grappled with when to certify a class
instead of relying on more traditional tools in its arsenal, like

213 See Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 40; Godsey, 31 Vet. App. at 230 (identifying class members); Skaar I, 31 Vet. App. at 18 (producing supplemental reports).
214 See U.S. VET. APP. R. 22–23 (noting the date that the Rules were added); see also
Amy B. Kretkowski, Evolution of a Class Action Rule, Power Point Presentation to the
USCAVC Judicial Conference, April 11, 2019 (on file with author).
215 Order, Skaar v. Wilkie, No. 17-2574, at *2 (Vet. App. filed Feb 1, 2019) (issuing a
limited remand to the Board of Veterans Appeals to determine whether facts support class
certification).
216 31 Vet. App. 156 (2019).
217 Id. at 18.
218 Id. Most federal appellate courts have similar procedures to remand decisions to
agencies for fact-finding. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
219 Skaar II, 31 Vet. App. at 19 (“[W]e clarify that the Court may, in certain circumstances, retain jurisdiction over limited remands to the Board.”). The VA was unable to
comply with the court’s order to identify the numbers of veterans in different subclasses,
citing the limitations of the VA’s own internal databases. Skaar II, 32 Vet. App. at 191. It
was able to identify that almost 1,388 participated in the nuclear cleanup that gave rise
to the dispute. Id. A better document-retention system, for a more recent dispute, could
assist the court not only in determining the appropriateness of class certification but also
in affording relief. See, e.g., Respondent’s 120-Day Status Update in Response to the
Court’s June 13, 2019 Order at 1, Godsey, 31 Vet. App. 207 (No. 17-4361) (Vet. App. filed
Aug. 13, 2019) (successfully identifying and certifying review of thousands of cases unreasonably delayed within months).
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issuing a precedential opinion. The court of appeals’ first successful class action, Godsey v. Wilkie,220 raised this question when petitioners challenged the VA’s persistent delays in transferring appellate records for review—a ministerial process that, on average,
took nearly one thousand days after veterans filed their substantive appeals.221 The court certified the class and found that the
VA’s practice violated the petitioners’ rights to due process. The
court reasoned that allegations of systemic delay were “best addressed in the class action context” because individual decisions
would “result in no more than line-jumping without resolving the
underlying problem of overall delay.”222 The court also found that
it could more “easily and efficiently” monitor compliance through
a class action than by requiring unrepresented claimants to file
more individual petitions.223
In short, the court held that class actions were superior to
precedential decisions when the relief itself required some form
of active, judicial management. To that end, the court ordered the
VA to identify all the class members subject to the same ministerial delay and to produce status reports on its progress.224 Relying
on the VA to work with class counsel to identify cases for adjudication proved very effective. Within four months, the Department
of Veterans Affairs reported that it had resolved over 2,106 of the
2,544 delayed claims in the class.225
Third and relatedly, the court has used class actions to effect
structural relief when the government does not comply with its
own binding decisions. For example, the Wolfe v. Wilkie226 class
challenged the VA’s practice of denying emergency medical coverage to veterans who received partial coverage from other insurance.227 In 2016, the court had already rejected the VA’s practice

220

31 Vet. App. 207 (2019).
ANNUAL REPORT, U.S. CT. OF APP. FOR VETERANS CLAIMS: OCT. 1, 2016 TO SEPT.
30, 2017 (FISCAL YEAR 2017) 1–2 (2018).
222 Godsey, 31 Vet. App. at 224 (quoting Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1039–40
(Fed. Cir. 2017)).
223 Id. (citing Monk, 855 F.3d at 1321).
224 Id. at 230 (ordering the secretary to conduct a “pre-certification review of all cases
that fit within the class definition” within 120 days).
225 See Respondent’s 120-Day Status Update in Response to the Court’s June 13, 2019
Order at 1, Godsey, 31 Vet. App. 207 (No. 17-4361) (Vet. App. filed Aug. 13, 2019). Observing that the VA had “faithfully complied” with its class action order, the court ordered a
new status report in 120 days. Order, Godsey, No. 17-4361, at *1 (Vet. App. filed Aug. 13, 2019).
226 32 Vet. App. 1 (2019).
227 Id. at 23.
221
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of denying emergency room coverage.228 But the VA continued to
do so anyway. It even went further—affirmatively telling veterans that they would not receive coverage for the very emergency
medical care that the court had ordered.229 Fed up, the court concluded that a class action was necessary: “Who knows how many
veterans relied on such a misrepresentation—for that is what it
was—in deciding not to appeal VA decisions that denied reimbursement for non-VA emergency medical care”?230 In pointed language, the court ruled that a class-wide judgment was the only
realistic answer for unrepresented veterans challenging the VA’s
refusal to follow the court’s precedent.231
Unlike Godsey, however, Wolfe also required the court to take
firm steps to effectuate relief, demonstrating the importance of
class-wide remedies to resolve recurring government disputes. After the court certified the class, it ordered the VA to stop sending
letters containing its erroneous reading of the law, to notify claimants that they were eligible to be reimbursed for their emergency
room benefits, and to give claimants new hearings.232 But the VA
struggled to comply with the court’s orders—delaying the corrected notices,233 misinforming veterans about their rights
(again),234 and losing track of which veterans received hearings or
reimbursements.235 Many problems only came to light after class
counsel reviewed the VA’s status reports, interviewed and responded to complaints from class members, and raised concerns

228
229
230
231

Staab v. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 50, 55 (2016).
Wolfe, 32 Vet. App. at 12.
Id.
The court said:

Here, though another precedential decision would undoubtedly bind VA, Petitioner Wolfe’s allegations uniquely highlight the inferiority of a precedential decision under the facts before us. VA could circumvent another decision—as it
allegedly did Staab—without concern about enforcement beyond another appellate proceeding. If we award the Wolfe Class’s requested relief, any class member (particularly those who are absent) who suffers VA’s noncompliance could
enforce it.
Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 41.
233 Order, Wolfe v. Wilkie, No. 18-6091, at *1 (Vet. App. filed Apr. 6, 2020).
234 Id.; Petitioner’s Opposed Motion for Enforcement of the Court’s Order of September
9, 2019 and Other Relief at 9, Wolfe v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207 (No. 18-6091) (noting that
for six months after the Wolfe decision, the VA’s website continued to assert that it would
not reimburse for emergency medical care).
235 See generally Petitioner’s Opposed Motion for Appointment of a Special Master to
Enforce the Court’s Judgment, in Wolfe v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207 (No. 18-6091) (describing obstacles to government notification and compliance with courts’ orders).
232
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with the VA’s own data.236 In March 2021, the court appointed a
special master to supervise the VA’s outreach efforts, a solution
that would not have been practical in individual adjudication.237
In short, experiments in Skaar, Godsey, and Wolfe helped the
court forge new rules to develop facts, identify class members, select appropriate cases for class certification, and refine tools to
monitor compliance with its own orders. In the process, the class
action created a vehicle for the court to learn about systemic problems and to protect its own jurisdiction to hear cases otherwise
frustrated by delay, poor record-keeping, or maladministration.238
But, in many of the above cases, the court was also forced to
grapple with whether an appellate court’s traditional mechanism
to correct unlawful agency action—binding precedent—was
enough. In Skaar, the court created an avenue to temporarily remand the case to the agency for more fact-finding to determine
the need for a class action.239 In Godsey, the court found that only
a class-wide judgment could provide the legal access and

236

Id.
Wolfe v. McDonough, 34 Vet. App. 162, 167 (2021); see supra Part I.B.3 (discussing
how individualized decisions limit courts’ ability to collect information about government
policies or practices and thereby implement appropriate remedies). As this article was
going to press, the Federal Circuit reversed the writ of mandamus in Wolfe, but it did not
decide whether the class action was warranted. See Wolfe, 28 F.4th at 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022)
(declining to “reach the issue of class certification). Instead, it found that one of the traditional requirements for a writ of mandamus was missing—that a traditional appeal
couldn’t have achieved the same result. Id. at 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (stating that mandamus “should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy” (quoting
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953))). Notably, the Federal
Circuit did not address many of the on-the-ground obstacles unrepresented veterans reported when appealing the same unlawful policy, like those described above. It also appeared to ignore cases, like those described in Part II.A, where courts have relaxed mandamus requirements for recurring legal issues or those that threaten the separation of
powers. As several commentators and judges argue, mandamus “should primarily be employed to address questions likely of significant repetition prior to effective review, so that
[the court’s] opinion would assist other jurists, parties, or lawyers.” Paul R. Gugliuzza,
The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 359 (2012) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir. 1994)
(“We regard the case for mandamus here as especially compelling because it is important
in the right way. It poses an elemental question of judicial authority.”). Nevertheless,
somewhat mysteriously, the court appeared to leave the door open for relief when the government obstructs people from filing claims. Wolfe, 28 F.4th at 1359 (“We have no occasion
to determine what forms of equitable relief might be available if the government inappropriately deterred potential claimants from pursuing their claims.”).
238 Petitioner’s Opposed Motion to Clarify the Role of Class Counsel at 1–2, Wolfe v.
Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 207 (No. 18-6091) (describing the role of class counsel in identifying
government errors and effecting compliance with the court’s judgment).
239 See 31 Vet. App. at 18.
237

2022]

The Class Appeal

1465

uniformity necessary to respond to systemic delays.240 And, in
both Godsey and Wolfe, the court concluded that a class action
ensured better compliance with its own orders than case-by-case
precedential decision-making.241 Each case illustrates the value of
case management tools, including class actions, to support the
courts’ traditional role in authoritatively deciding law.
III. PROCEDURAL INNOVATION AND OUR CHECKS AND BALANCES
There are many good reasons to question whether other appellate courts would broadly adopt class actions under the All
Writs Act. The Supreme Court has become increasingly skeptical
of using aggregate litigation, including class actions and other
creative procedural tools, to challenge unlawful government
actions.242
But beyond what the Supreme Court might say about them,
appellate classes raise concerns about how judges can and should
exercise power over facts, the coordinate branches of government,
and procedural rules designed to limit their authority. First,
when appellate bodies must find facts outside of an existing record to certify a class, they risk upsetting the balance of power between themselves and the fact-finding tribunals they review. Second, appellate classes place the legality of the government’s
nationwide programs in the hands of a single, regional appellate
court. Finally, when judges develop class procedures out of whole
cloth, they assume new power to change preexisting rules that
are meant to apply the same way across different cases, parties,
and judges.
When used cautiously, however, appellate courts can adopt
class procedures consistent with the judiciary’s historic role in reviewing agency action, its place in our governmental framework,
and the boundaries of its procedural authority. First, courts acting in an appellate capacity historically have considered new facts
to determine whether government officials acted unlawfully.
Moreover, class challenges may promote better interactions between the judicial and executive branches—allowing courts to
240

See 31 Vet. App. at 224.
See id.; 32 Vet. App. at 33.
242 See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 858 n.7 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“This Court has never addressed whether
habeas relief can be pursued in a class action.”); United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S.
Ct. 1532, 1539–40 (2018) (rejecting exercise of appellate courts’ “supervisory jurisdiction”
under the All Writs Act to preserve claims without a class action).
241
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review recurring problems and avoid piecemeal remedies that
frustrate the operation of a national bureaucracy. And procedural
experiments may be particularly justified in situations that have
already given rise to some appellate class actions—particularly in
instances where policymakers lack the ability to design critical
rules without insights from case-by-case adjudication.
A. Appellate Class Actions and Fact-finding
Because class actions often require courts to resolve many
complex factual questions, they present challenges for appellate
bodies.243 For that reason, in one of the only decisions to explicitly
reject an appellate class action, then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
declared that an “appellate mode of proceeding is not compatible
with designation and management of a class.”244 But the history
behind that idea is not so clear cut. When legislatures require
that appellate bodies directly review agencies, they have long
used tools, like special masters and remands to agencies, to assess
whether government officials acted unlawfully.245 And the Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims has shown that class actions are
indeed possible in cases that frustrate their jurisdiction to decide
recurring legal questions.
One intriguing aspect of appellate classes is that they risk
upsetting appellate courts’ traditional approach to facts. Appellate courts are supposed to be courts of “review, not of first
view.”246 That is, they typically respect factual determinations
made by other bodies so long as they are not clearly wrong. Class
actions, however, often require factual development beyond a single trial or administrative record: How many people were

243 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 144–45 (1986) (“[F]actfinding[ ] is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts.” (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982))).
244 Burns v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 701 F.2d 189, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1983). That case did not
involve a class action under the All Writs Act, but rather, one under the appellate court’s
“inherent authority” to hear classes. Justice Ginsburg believed that federal district courts
should hear those cases. For the reasons discussed in Part I.A, however, courts have rejected that position to prevent gamesmanship, avoid uncertainty, and promote the development of law. See, e.g., Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 24 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting); Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1084–87, 1093.
245 FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 469 (1984) (holding that federal
appellate courts may use special masters or agency remand to resolve factual questions
when Congress directly channels judicial review); JAFFE, supra note 62, at 186–87 (describing circumstances in which federal and state courts have historically used agency
remands or conducted fact-finding themselves).
246 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).
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adversely impacted by the agencies’ practice? Did the plaintiffs
raise factual questions common to an entire class of people? Some
of the most valuable class actions against government entities
may require very detailed fact-finding to determine whether a
common practice applies to a class of people, which is a task often
performed by district courts.247
It is unclear, however, how far to take concerns about the limits of appellate fact-finding when Congress deliberately upends
appellate courts’ role in the judicial hierarchy. When Congress
writes laws that send cases directly into appellate courts to facilitate
judicial review, is it clear that Congress meant to deny those same
courts the power to review evidence of misconduct that frustrates
their jurisdiction? Or should those courts have access to procedures used by district courts, long tasked with that same kind of job?
Allowing appellate courts to resolve factual questions is consistent with history. In the nineteenth century, federal and state
appellate courts often determined factual questions themselves
under different mechanisms, including writs of mandamus,248 to
evaluate whether government officials violated a clear legal
duty.249 In those cases, courts took evidence like any court sitting
in law or equity. For example, when Congress created a special
commission to resolve land disputes with Mexico in 1854, it gave
claimants the right to “appeal” to a federal court in California.
(Congress did not create “intermediate” courts of appeals until
1891.)250 The Supreme Court held the designated court could resolve both law and facts for itself, observing that it would not be
“misled by a name” and instead would “look to the substance and
intent of the proceeding.”251
247 See Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L.
REV. 59, 84 (2019) (describing historical examples of civil rights class actions where what
“tie[d] the potential plaintiffs together [was] not the defendant’s inability to treat them
differently, but the defendant’s actual conduct that treat[ed] them similarly”); David
Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 799–805 (2016).
248 JAFFE, supra note 62, at 160–64; Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control
of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. L.J. 287, 295–97 (1948) (describing the historical development of judicial review of administrative orders); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256,
1334–37 (2006); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 200–29 (1991) (describing models of judicial review
in the nineteenth century); Merrill, supra note 148, at 946–53.
249 Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded
Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1407–11 (2010).
250 Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
251 See United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 534 (1854); see also Merrill,
supra note 148, at 950 (discussing Richie and the broad fact-finding powers exercised by
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Over time, legislatures modified ancient writs to accommodate the growth of modern agencies, generally respecting agencies’ administrative determinations unless “clearly erroneous.”252
But courts still retained the ability to find facts themselves in extraordinary cases. New Jersey appellate courts could assess new
facts or ask agencies themselves to do it for them.253 California
courts adopted a mixed approach. They reviewed the existing administrative record (a process associated with a writ of certiorari),
but also independently took new evidence when government officials improperly refused evidence (much like a writ of mandamus)—or what some called “certiorarified mandamus.”254 In the
1940s, Congress similarly preserved federal courts’ power to decide facts necessary to issue writs “which may be necessary for
the exercise of their respective jurisdictions.”255 Even as federal
and state legislatures cut back on judicial power to make new factual determinations, they recognized occasions for courts to determine factual questions when necessary to establish when officials
violated the law.256
Developing facts in such cases was key to maintaining courts’
own role in an increasingly complex and modern administrative
state. But even in such cases, appellate courts have used their
authority cautiously to resolve only those factual questions necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction. Mindful of their limited
jurisdiction to resolve factual disputes, appellate courts have
avoided needlessly issuing writs, while establishing tools to

courts in the nineteenth century); Adam S. Zimmerman, Presidential Settlements, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1393, 1411–12 (2015) (describing historical use of mandamus review to reverse
administrative claim commissions until 1949).
252 Merrill, supra note 148, at 965–72 (describing early twentieth century development of statutes providing for a more “appellate model” of review of agency action than
those rooted in mandamus or habeas).
253 N.J. RULE 2:10-5 (1953).
254 See Ralph N. Kleps, Certiorarified Mandamus: Court Review of California Administrative Decisions 1939-49, 2 STAN. L. REV. 285, 285 & n.1, 286–88 (1950) (describing the
history and changes to the California code to improve review of state agencies).
255 28 U.S.C. § 377 (1940) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651) (providing that federal
courts “shall have power to issue all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law”).
256 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 404 n.8 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When federal law imposes an obligation, however, [judicial review] is not precluded simply because facts must be developed to ascertain whether a federal command
has been dishonored.”).
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determine narrow factual issues—using special masters and limited remands to agencies to supplement the record.257
For example, as discussed above, the United States Court of
Veterans Appeals for Veterans Claims recently remanded a class
action challenging how the VA measures radiation exposure.258 In
addition to asking the VA to determine how many plaintiffs were
impacted by the VA’s methodology, the Court also asked the
agency to determine whether the methodology was grounded in
“sound scientific evidence.” On remand, the court gave the agency
ninety days to reach a conclusion based on the parties’ evidentiary
submissions.259 Giving agencies the chance to explain old scientific judgments, or make new ones, reflects one way appellate
courts, like the CAVC, have balanced their roles as courts with
limited jurisdiction over a coordinate branch of government, while
maintaining their authority to hear from parties and interpret
the law.260
For challenges that target deficiencies in an agency’s hearing
process, federal appellate courts may also appoint special masters. Courts have long enjoyed the “power to provide themselves
with appropriate instruments required for the performance of
their duties,” which includes the “authority to appoint persons
unconnected with the court to aid [them].”261 Appellate courts can
do so under one of three routes. First, courts of appeals may appoint a special master to hold hearings on matters “ancillary to
the proceeding[ ]” under the federal rules of appellate procedure.262 Second, appellate courts could appoint a special master or

257 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 165, at 845–46 (observing the practice where appellate courts retain jurisdiction for the “purpose[ ] . . . [of] facilitat[ing] immediate review
of further proceedings before the trial court or agency”); Ucelo–Gomez v. Gonzales, 464
F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2006) (issuing a limited remand to the agency to “decide the scope
of [a] statutory term in a fact context sufficient[ ]” for appellate review); Caterpillar, Inc.
v. NLRB, 138 F.3d 1105, 1107–08 (7th Cir. 1998) (issuing a limited remand to the agency
to approve a settlement, while keeping jurisdiction so that the parties do not have to refile
in case the settlement was not approved); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n,
988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (issuing limited remand to the agency to provide the
reasoning for its decision).
258 Skaar I, 31 Vet. App. at 17–18.
259 Skaar II, 32 Vet. App. at 171; see also supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text.
260 See, e.g., Elgin, 567 U.S. at 19 (describing the power of the Federal Circuit to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over legal questions while remanding to the Merit Systems
Protection Board to administer oaths and develop the factual record).
261 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–13 (1920).
262 FED. R. APP. P. 48. With almost no case law, it unclear where to draw the line on
what “ancillary” means for Rule 48 appointments. On the one hand, the rule has typically
only applied to attorney misconduct or fee disputes. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon,
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remand to a district court under a special statute like the
Administrative Orders Review Act, which channels many cases
into appellate courts.263 Third, the court could appoint a special
master under its inherent authority, like that possessed by the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,264 or under the All Writs
Act itself.265
Although such procedures may seem cumbersome and unorthodox, the Supreme Court has endorsed them for laws that channel systemic government challenges into federal appellate
courts.266 After a law sent class-wide challenges against a federal
employment board into the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court
rejected the dissent’s arguments that agency remands created “an
odd sequence of procedural hoops for petitioners to jump
through.”267 The Court defended the process of agency remands,
observing “we see nothing extraordinary in a statutory scheme
that vests reviewable fact-finding authority in a non–Article III
entity that has jurisdiction over an action but cannot finally decide the legal question to which the facts pertain.”268 In so doing,
the Court compared the procedure to federal judges who rely on
other non–Article III officers, like magistrate judges or agency
officials.269
824 F.3d 571, 576 (5th Cir. 2016) (discussing the appointment of a special master to conduct a fact-finding investigation into ethical violations); FED. R. APP. P. 48 Advisory committee note (discussing attorney’s fees). On the other hand, the rule seems designed to
provide for situations where an appellate court cannot remand to an agency or a court to
develop the “merits,” and so, must rely on a judicial adjunct. One could argue that class
certification remains “ancillary” to whether an agency has violated the All Writs Act, even
though questions about class action certification frequently overlap with the merits. See
Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013) (“Rule 23
grants courts no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification
stage.”).
263 28 U.S.C. § 2347(b)(3); see, e.g., Gallo-Alvarez v. Ashcroft, 266 F.3d 1123, 1129–30
(9th Cir. 2001) (transferring an immigration petition to a district court “for further development of the record”).
264 See Wolfe, 34 Vet. App. at 164.
265 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) (noting that “it is the duty of the court
to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry” into the petitioner’s claim).
266 Elgin, 567 U.S. at 13–14; see also ITT World Commc’ns, 466 U.S. at 469 (recommending special masters or agency remand to develop the record when statutes channel
judicial review directly to appellate court); Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr.,
750 F.2d at 78 (recommending the same and noting that “[w]e find untenable any suggestion that appellate review of nonfinal agency action may be inadequate due to Courts of
Appeals’ inability to take evidence”).
267 Elgin, 567 U.S. at 32 (Alito, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 19.
269 Id.
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A persistent question will be how much power federal appellate courts should give to other officers to decide important factual questions related to class certification or their own jurisdiction.270 A special master should not be a “roving commissioner of
justice.”271 When appellate courts allow officers to review unlawful government action, they arguably give up one of the benefits
of federal judicial review—an independent, generalist review of
the coordinate branches that binds all parties. For that reason,
appellate courts may choose to limit agency remands and special
masters to cases raising discrete, sophisticated factual questions—like the impact of a common policy or delay on similarly
situated parties. And they may reserve for themselves questions
that threaten the integrity of the court’s own proceedings, like potential conflicts of interest between class members, structural
concerns with a government adjudication process, or whether a
government agency has complied with the court’s mandate.272
B. Appellate Class Actions and Separation of Powers
Appellate class actions also raise concerns about how appellate courts can limit the executive branch’s power to defend its
views about federal law in other regional courts.273 But, in some
cases, class actions preserve our separation of powers and improve dialogue between the judicial and executive branch. This
enables appellate courts to review persistent problems while
avoiding remedies that, when applied one at a time, aggravate
discrepancies and delays.
By way of background, appellate courts try to craft precedential decisions to avoid creating unnecessary splits with courts in

270 An analogy can be found in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). That statute prevents non–
Article III magistrate judges from formally resolving class action motions, but still empowers
them to “conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings” for district court review. In
practice, district courts frequently rely on magistrate judges to take evidence necessary to
resolve class action motions. Cf. Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than
Indispensable”: The Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in
the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845, 932 (2016) (tracing the rise in magistrate judge
utilization to the “increased legal and evidentiary complexity” of district court cases).
271 Wolfe, 34 Vet. App. at 168.
272 E.g., American Trucking Ass’n v. ICC, 669 F.2d 957, 961 (5th Cir. 1982) (approving
the aggregate relief necessary to effectuate a mandate given that “[l]itigation in scores of
cases is not adequate remedy for an agency’s failure to carry out its statutory duties”).
273 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 729 (arguing that executive power to do so
is “embedded in the congressional choice in favor of administrative government”).
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other circuits.274 But the potential for differences between circuits
is a feature, not a bug, for courts and agencies.275 A driving reason
for our intermediate appellate courts was to create courts that
could thoroughly air legal disputes.276 And, for agencies, limited
precedential decision-making offers flexibility to continue to administer large, bureaucratic programs in other regions not covered by a particular court, banking on the idea that it may convince another court of appeals to accept its view of the law.277
Moreover, a court decision is technically only binding on the
parties to that case.278 For this reason, some have asserted that
federal agencies may continue to disregard a seemingly applicable precedent in that very circuit.279 Agencies defending this idea,
a tongue-twisting doctrine called “intracircuit nonacquiescence,”
also point to the important role of facilitating dialogue between
courts and agencies.280 When the government can resist appellate
decisions issued inside the same circuit, appellate courts can revisit their decisions in light of other appellate courts and avoid
escalating issues to the Supreme Court. In this way, limited precedential decision-making plays an important role in arbitrating
our separation of powers—permitting different members of the
274 See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The federal
courts spread across the country owe respect to each other’s efforts and should strive to
avoid conflicts, but each has an obligation to engage independently in reasoned analysis.”);
Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. PITT.
L. REV. 1029, 1039 (1999) (listing harms of appellate unpredictability); Arthur D. Hellman,
By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U.
PITT. L. REV. 693, 779–80, 794 & n.401 (1995) (noting how appellate courts sometimes
decide cases in ways that mollify circuit splits).
275 For a recent critique of the conventional wisdom that legal issues should be allowed to percolate through disagreement in the lower courts, see generally Michael
Coenen & Seth Davis, Percolation’s Value, 73 STAN. L. REV. 363 (2021).
276 United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 177 (1984) (White, J., concurring) (“The policy against inconsistent decisions is much less relevant outside the original
circuit. Conflicts in the circuits are generally accepted and in some ways even welcomed.”).
277 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 737–38; Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1093.
278 See U.S. v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–63 (1984).
279 See, e.g., Rebecca Hanner White, Time for A New Approach: Why the Judiciary
Should Disregard the “Law of the Circuit” When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the
National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 674 (1991) (calling for the abandonment of the “law of the circuit” doctrine when confronting Board nonacquiescence); Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence:
A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 832 (1990) (“The courts may not, however, in the absence of
express congressional authorization, act to truncate the dialogue by erecting a per se bar
against intracircuit nonacquiescence.”); Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1413 (1991) (summarizing agency
defenses of intra-circuit nonacquiscence).
280 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 743.
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judicial branch to “say what the law is,”281 while allowing the
executive branch to develop and defend its own legal interpretations and policies.
But no principle of class action law requires courts to limit a
class to a single state or region. Instead, courts enjoy wide discretion to certify classes for all similarly impacted parties, regardless
of where they live in the country.282 That discretion may be particularly important when plaintiffs seek “indivisible” remedies for
organizational delay or dysfunction—increased funding, new
training, or other organizational reforms that cannot be neatly
carved out from region to region.283 How should rules that typically empower courts to certify nationwide classes be balanced
against executive power to defend its own interpretations of law
in different appellate courts?
One the one hand, it is true that class actions theoretically
could threaten dialogue between circuits and with federal agencies in much the same way that some commentators complain
about nationwide injunctions outside the class action context.284
One classic study of nonacquiescence, for example, involved cases
where the Reagan administration ignored injunctions entered by
district courts and affirmed by courts of appeals in the Second and
Ninth Circuit against the Social Security Administration.285
Although the study did not focus on the procedure the parties
used to obtain those injunctions, many were class actions.286 Unsurprisingly, it found that agencies expressed a similar concern
about how agencies and courts interact with each other—that a

281

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699–701 (1979) (reasoning that the district
court’s decision to certify a nationwide class action fell within the court’s broad “discretion”).
283 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.04(a) at 117 (AM. LAW INST.
2010) (defining “[i]ndivisible remedies” as those where “the distribution of relief to [any]
claimant will ‘as a practical matter’ determine the application or availability of [the same
remedy] to other claimants”).
284 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
285 See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 692–703; Ruppert v. Bowen, 871 F.2d
1172, 1177 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The SSA evidently considers itself bound only by the decisions
of the Supreme Court and by those decisions of the applicable circuit court to which the
SSA has not announced its objections.” (first citing Press Release, HHS NEWS, DEP’T
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.. (June 1985); and then citing OFF. OF HEARINGS & APPEALS,
STAFF GUIDES AND PROGRAMS DIGEST BULLETIN NO. III-I 4 (Aug. 1986)).
286 See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 39, at 699–703 (offering an in-depth discussion of Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984) and Stieberger v. Heckler, 615
F. Supp. 1315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), which were both class actions).
282
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single court’s determination would “prematurely truncate” dialogue about whether an agency acted lawfully.287
But the failure to hear class actions can cut the other way—
threatening our separation of powers by impairing the judiciary’s
ability to “say what the law is,” while truncating important dialogue between courts and the executive branch. Courts have repeatedly chastised agencies like the Social Security Administration
for violating judicial power to determine the law by ignoring appellate decisions.288 Others have complained that this practice
contravenes one of the traditional justifications for the legitimacy
of agency adjudication: the availability of judicial review.289 They
have observed that Congress provided that “courts would review
the actions of agencies—not vice versa.”290
As importantly, many challenged agency practices—multiyear backlogs, insufficient notice, and inadequate translators,
doctors, or records—frustrate an appellate court’s ability to hear
those very claims individually and issue opinions needed to efficiently guide future administrative action.291 Congress itself
nearly barred the Social Security Administration’s practice of ignoring appellate decisions, observing that government refusals to
adhere to circuit precedent have the “clearly . . . undesirable
287

Id. at 685.
Capitano v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 732 F.2d 1066, 1070 n.9 (2d Cir.
1984) (criticizing the Social Security Administration); Ruppert, 871 F.2d at 1177 (2d Cir.
1989) (criticizing the Social Security Administration); Johnson, 969 F.2d at 1090 (criticizing the Railroad Retirement Board); Young v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 201, 215–16 (2012)
(criticizing the Veterans Administration); see also Coenen, supra note 279, at 1400 &
nn.314–19 (collecting cases and observing that “[i]nfuriated federal judges have called intracircuit nonacquiescence ‘utterly meritless,’ ‘intolerable,’ ‘outrageous,’ ‘shocking,’ a ‘symbolic bookburning,’ and the equivalent of ‘the repudiated pre-Civil War doctrine of nullification’” (citations omitted)).
289 See Thomas v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 492, 496 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (noting that, by
providing for judicial review, the Social Security Act “recognizes the primacy of the courts
in determining the law”); Joshua Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1850–51 (1989); Matthew Diller & Nancy
Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 819 (1990) (noting that judicial review
“is the principal means” used by Congress “to hold agencies accountable to statutory limitations on agency power”). But see Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1368 (2018) (recognizing that some “constitutional functions[ ] that can be carried out by ‘the executive or legislative departments’ without judicial determination” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
290 Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Non-Acquiescence,
75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1375 n.186 (1991).
291 Cf. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 113, at 826 (describing the “serious due process
concerns” raised when agencies can unilaterally delay the “application of judicial standards” in a particular circuit.).
288
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consequence’ of generating repetitious appeals costly to both
claimants and the government.”292 And, as illustrated in Part II,293
even when cases reach an appellate court, a precedential decision
does not offer much when unrepresented parties cannot understand and apply it. Instead of intruding on the executive branch,
the flexible use of aggregate litigation may ensure that courts
have the power to hear transitory claims and that appellate decisions are carried out.
Finally, some forms of relief may only be available through
class-wide adjudication. Parties seeking structural or organizational reforms—new training programs to avoid bias, funding,
and hiring practices—may not be easy to break up along regional
lines.294 Such relief has long provided a basis for national class
action adjudication for this very reason.295 In some cases, class actions involving organizations and their interconnected practices
may actually promote better interactions between the judicial
and executive branches—avoiding piecemeal remedies that, applied one at a time, aggravate delays, frustrate the uniform operation of a national bureaucracy, and limit access to justice.296
These very concerns gave rise to the modern class action in
the United States. Court reformers believed that piecemeal challenges were no match for large institutions and government bureaucracies.297 The effort to remake the class action coincided with
efforts after Brown v. Board of Education298 to desegregate southern schools. According to the late Charles Alan Wright, one of the
lead drafters of modern class action rule, class action rule-makers
were “keenly interested” in organizational practices used by government bodies to create end-runs around desegregation

292 Coenen, supra note 279, at 1377 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
38, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3080, 3096 (Conf. Rep.)) (alteration in original).
293 See supra notes 220–238 and accompanying text.
294 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:35 (collecting cases where class-wide relief was
necessary to bring about “institutional change[ ]”).
295 See Marcus, supra note 2, at 702; David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class
Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 608 (2013).
296 Godsey, 31 Vet. App. at 214 (finding that class-wide relief in an appellate court
was necessary to avoid inconsistent relief that would aggravate delays); Ebanks v.
Shulkin, 877 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that class-wide relief was necessary to prevent “line-jumping” that would occur when courts hear individual petitions for
mandamus for unreasonable delay).
297 Marvin Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST
L.J. 295, 299 (1966) (“[T]he class action’s ‘historic mission [was] taking care of the smaller
guy.’” (quoting Civil Rules Committee Reporter, Benjamin Kaplan)).
298 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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decisions.299 For example, when school districts demanded that
black students individually exhaust state administrative remedies to benefit from a desegregation order, an early Fifth Circuit
decision, Potts v. Flax,300 held that the class could still be certified
to combat an unlawful policy: “Exhaustion of internal school system administrative remedies is not required so long as racial segregation is the authoritative accepted policy.”301 Rule-makers revised the class action rule to make clear that courts could use
class actions to protect our courts’ role in our separation of powers
as arbiters of the law, specifically including Potts as an exemplar
among cases alleging systemic government misconduct.302
One way to accommodate these competing concerns may be
found in lower federal court experiments with public interest
class actions. In the early 1970s, federal district courts created a
“necessity doctrine.” It requires that courts weigh whether a class
action is necessary, in light of all the other tools courts can use to
bind the government, including precedential decisions and injunctions.303 Most recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims’ rules now require that parties explain why a class action,
instead of a precedential decision, is necessary to give plaintiffs
the relief they want.304
In these cases, courts have still found class actions “necessary” to safeguard courts’ role in our separation of powers. Courts

299 Marcus, supra note 2, at 703 n.267 (quoting Letter from Charles Alan Wright,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Texas, to Benjamin Kaplan, Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch.
(Feb. 16, 1963), microformed on CIS-7004-34 (Jud. Conf. Records, Cong. Info. Serv.)).
300 313 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 1963).
301 Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 290. (5th Cir 1963).
302 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments
(recommending courts certify classes for injunctive or declaratory relief even when the
defendant’s actions threaten only “one or a few members of the class, provided [the defendant’s conduct] is based on grounds which have general application to the class.”); see
also Maureen Carroll, Alexandra D. Lahav, David Marcus & Adam S. Zimmerman, Government Class Actions After Jennings v. Rodriguez, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (MAY 8, 2018),
https://perma.cc/UG4N-QGZB; Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843,
859–60 (2016); Marcus, supra note 2, at 705.
303 For early appellate court decisions endorsing this doctrine, see, for example, Kansas
Health Care Ass’n v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1548 (10th Cir.
1994); Sandford v. R.L. Coleman Realty Co., 573 F.2d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1978); Craft v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 534 F.2d 684, 686 (6th Cir. 1976), rev’d on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. Delray
Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 812 (5th Cir. 1974); Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261–62 (2d
Cir. 1973).
304 U.S. VET. APP. R. 22(a)(3) (requiring petitioners to explain why a class action
“would serve the interests of justice to a greater degree than would a precedential decision
granting relief on a non-class action basis”).

2022]

The Class Appeal

1477

have relied upon class actions when, among other things, the government can strategically frustrate claims, avoid judicial review,
or ignore its judgments.305 All of these cases illustrate the limits
of traditional, case-by-case adjudication for unrepresented government litigants: without a class-wide judgment, courts cede
power to other government institutions to determine the scope of
judicial relief from their own unlawful policies.306
Over the years, administrative agencies have themselves discarded precedential decision-making in favor of other tools that
can promote consistency and efficiency—including rulemaking,
guidance, and data analytics designed to pool information about
pending claims.307 In the same way, courts charged with policing
agencies may need similar case management tools (like class actions) to ensure that parties pool information necessary for a fulsome record and to effectuate judgments that correspond to novel
complaints about systemic government misconduct.

305 Courts have found class certification warranted when, among other things, (1) the
plaintiff’s claims “might be rendered moot” by the government without a class; (2) a class
action necessarily “facilitate[s] enforcement of the judgment by class members”; (3) no certainty exists that the government “would apply the judgment uniformly to all members of
the proposed class”; or (4) “a class [is] an effective device to bring about institutional
change[ ].” 2 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:35 (collecting cases); Karen L. ex rel. Jane
L. v. Physicians Health Services, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 94, 103–04 (D. Conn. 2001) (collecting
cases); Nehmer, 118 F.R.D. at 118–20 (rejecting the necessity requirement and finding
class action an effective tool to bring about change in the Veteran’s Administration
regulations).
306 See Daniel Tenny, There Is Always A Need: The “Necessity Doctrine” and Class
Certification Against Government Agencies, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1037–39 (2005) (collecting cases and noting that the government may believe an injunction in an individual
case applies to a different group of beneficiaries than the court does).
307 Kristin E. Hickman, Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE
L.J. 931, 984 (2021) (“[C]ontemporary agencies more often use rulemaking [rather than
adjudication] when making significant interpretive pronouncements.”); Sam Kalen, The
Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 657, 670 (2008) (“[F]ederal agencies lean
toward interpretive rules and policy guidance whenever possible.”); Felix F. Bajandas &
Gerald K. Ray, IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF ELECTRONIC CASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
IN FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION 26–31 (2018); Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO.
L.J. 1147, 1186–91 (2017) (examining the potential for “adjudication by algorithm” in administrative agencies); Gerald K. Ray & Jeffery S. Lubbers, A Government Success Story:
How Data Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from the
Administrative Conference of the United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability
Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1575, 1593–1601 (2015).
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C. Appellate Class Actions and Procedural Innovation
Courts may naturally resist the use of ancient writs to police
complex regulatory schemes adopted by a coordinate branch of
government.308 After all, Congress and rulemaking bodies within
the courts have increasingly developed clear statutes and rules
that define the boundaries of federal court jurisdiction. And taken
too far, novel class-wide injunctions could upset traditional requirements—finality, ripeness, and exhaustion—designed to
cabin appellate review.309 But procedural experiments may be
particularly justified in two situations that have already given
rise to appellate class actions: (1) when rule-makers need courts
to decide important jurisdictional questions before they can create a formal rule and (2) when judges act to resolve common cases
that persistently evade their jurisdiction.
By way of background, courts frequently—but not always—
develop formal procedures to hear cases through advisory committees and other legislative-like processes.310 In so doing, they
hope to promote three interrelated goals. First, they protect the
parties’ expectations and rights, by creating formal, prospective
rules informed by large numbers of constituencies. 311 Second, they
promote consistent decision-making across different categories of
cases before they are filed.312 Third, they place limits on judicial
power to manage and adjudicate such cases.313
308 See, e.g., Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (“[W]here a
statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the
All Writs Act, that is controlling.” (quoting Pa. Bureau of Corr. V. U.S. Marshals Serv.,
474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985))); Pa. Bureau of Correction, 474 U.S. at 43 (“The All Writs Act is a
residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise covered by statute.”).
309 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175, 177–78 (1997).
310 Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1234–43 (2012);
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 893–97 (1999). But see Robin J. Effron,
The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 773 (2012).
311 See Bone, supra note 310, at 889, 935–39 (“[A] centralized, court-based, and
committee-centered process is well suited for making general constitutive rules that define
the basic framework of a civil procedure system and more detailed rules that control particularly costly forms of strategic behavior.”).
312 Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE
L.J. 669, 698–99 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377,
387–88 (2010); William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1893 (2002) (“If a dispute resolution system processes similar cases
to disparate outcomes, there is something wrong with the process.”).
313 Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 683, 687 (2014) (“The process . . . addresses judges in their roles as regulators of
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Recently, scholars have begun to explore when “procedural
experimentation” complements or frustrates the rights, rule of
law, and adjudicative values served by written procedures for
hearing cases and claims.314 On the one hand, when judges can
flexibly adjust rules to “fit the fuss” raised in unique and complex
cases, they may promote more fairness and efficiency than the
existing rules, while laying the groundwork for formalizing new
ones. On the other hand, when judges rewrite rules as a case
evolves, they frustrate the consistent application of law, impede
parties’ ability to assert their own rights, and upend rules designed to constrain judicial power.315
Some commentators have offered guidelines meant to limit
this kind of “ad hoc” rulemaking. Given the concerns expressed
above, judges arguably should avoid adopting new procedures
when rule-makers have already created procedures designed to
address the issue at bar.316 They should also stick to existing procedures when a newly designed rule would upset parties’ reliance
interests and rights.317
Under this analysis, class actions pursuant to the All Writs
Act provide a particularly compelling case for procedural innovation. The All Writs Act is a long-standing, gap-filling statute that
has been strictly interpreted to avoid upsetting parties’ rights or
reliance interests. It has long empowered courts to issue writs
and adopt procedures in aid of their jurisdiction. And courts typically only issue writs under the act when there is no procedural
alternative and when necessary to protect “clear and indisputable
right[s].”318
As it happens, the Supreme Court’s first significant statement about federal appellate power to develop new judicial remedies under the All Writs Act in government challenges came
nearly four years before the passage of the Administrative
procedure as well as subjects of procedural regulation, because they too are actors in the
dispute resolution system.”).
314 Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 VAND. L. REV. 821, 870–72 (2018);
Pamela Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 835–40
(2017); Gluck, supra note 40, at 1689.
315 Bookman & Noll, supra note 314, at 792–95; Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
41, 76 (1995) (fearing that broad discretion can create “arbitrary and discriminatory behavior”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 426–30 (1982) (arguing
that open-ended judicial discretion in case management threatens judges’ impartiality).
316 Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 54–55 (2019).
317 Id. at 74 & n.327.
318 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 (2004) (quotations marks omitted).
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Procedure Act, which then explicitly incorporated rules for staying government decisions. 319 In Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC,320 a broadcaster wanted to stay a decision by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) that improperly rescinded
its license without a hearing.321 The FCC argued that Congress
had never explicitly given courts the power to issue stays. The
Supreme Court permitted the stay. Writing for the Court, Justice
Frankfurter observed that “search[ing] for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage.”322 Tracing
the power to the very first Judiciary Act in 1789, Frankfurter
noted that appellate courts have long possessed power under the
All Writs Act “to prevent irreparable injury to the parties or to
the public” as “part of [courts’] traditional equipment for the administration of justice.”323 If Congress had to itemize every permissible judicial procedure and remedy, it would “stultify the purpose of Congress to utilize the courts as a means for vindicating
the public interest.”324
Scripps-Howard does not just show that appellate courts
have innovated with ad hoc procedures to review agencies for over
eighty years. Scripps-Howard shows how appellate courts that
rely on a limited and extraordinary remedy like that afforded by
the All Writs Act may even exhibit more respect for rule-makers
inside and outside of the courts. Congress may hope to streamline
appeals, for example, by directing an agency’s errors to appellate
courts in garden-variety cases. But Congress also needs courts to
flexibly interpret their jurisdiction to ensure that the executive
branch complies with its laws. A statute like the All Writs Act
provides appellate courts with room, in extraordinary cases, to
balance those competing goals. As one prominent treatise has
recognized:
One of the special advantages of review by extraordinary writ
is that it is possible to respond to a perceived need to provide
occasional appellate guidance on matters that often elude ordinary appeal, without establishing rules of appealability

319 Samuel I. Ferenc, Clear Rights and Worthy Claimants, Judicial Intervention in
Administrative Action Under the All Writs Act, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 127, 143 (2018).
320 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
321 Id. at 5–6.
322 Id. at 11.
323 Id. at 9–10.
324 Id. at 15.
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that will bring a flood of less important appeals in their
wake.325
More broadly, experiments with appellate class actions suggest two occasions that may support the use of procedural innovation in appellate courts and beyond. First, there will be times
when a court cannot adopt a formal procedure without some experimentation. Second, novel procedures may be necessary to protect a court’s jurisdiction over common cases and claims from delay or dysfunction.
First, courts may innovate on a case-by-case basis when open
questions about their jurisdictional power cannot be resolved in a
formal rulemaking process. Advisory committees in federal court,
for example, have avoided developing class action rules when they
simultaneously raise questions about federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction. Recently, the federal advisory committee assigned to
develop new class action rules in federal courts declined to make
special rules preventing defendants from mooting a class by “picking off” lead plaintiffs. The federal rules committee reasoned that
it could not use rulemaking to resolve those kinds of jurisdictional
questions without more guidance from the Supreme Court in
case-by-case adjudication. 326 More recently, an advisory committee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has benefited from incremental judgments about the court’s own jurisdiction in class actions—including whether the court could find facts
in mandamus petitions and whether it could exercise jurisdiction
over claims not yet appealed.327 Other courts have similarly benefited from experiments with class actions before formalizing
them into a rule.328

325

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 165, at § 3934.1.
Rule 23 Subcommittee Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Conference Call 107–
11 (2016) (putting rulemaking questions to address “pick[ing] off” lead plaintiffs because
of new questions raised by the Supreme Court’s Article III jurisprudence),
https://perma.cc/9AUG-2ZC6.
327 See U.S. VET. APP. RULE 22(d)(1) (“In managing the litigation of a class action proceeding under this Rule, the Court may issue all orders that it deems necessary and
proper.”); United States Court of Veterans Claims, Misc. Order at 1, In re Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Misc. No. 12-20 (Nov. 10, 2020) (noting that the rules benefitted from the
“views of [the] Rules Advisory Committee); see also supra notes 213–37 and accompanying
text; Amy B. Kretkowski, Evolution of a Class Action Rule (2019) (Power Point Presentation
to the USCAVC Judicial Conference) (on file with author).
328 For example, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims experimented with class actions for
ten years before making a formal rule. See Kominers v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 684, 685–
86 (1983). The court reasoned that “the better road to follow” was to hear class actions on
a “case-by-case basis, gaining and evaluating experience as we study and decide the class-suit
326
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These conclusions are at odds with the general preference
that scholars have expressed for formal, prospective rulemaking
in agencies.329 But experiments with appellate class actions highlight one advantage of procedural innovation in courts. When
courts adopt rules incrementally, they can answer questions
about their jurisdictional power that formal rule-makers cannot
while also providing them with insights and information for the
future.
Second, procedural innovation may be more justified when
the court seeks to protect its own jurisdiction to interpret law and
award meaningful and orderly relief. This Article has argued
that, at least in the review of mass adjudication systems, appellate class actions can help preserve the courts’ role in our separation of powers to hear parties’ claims, expound legal rules, afford
relief, and ensure the executive branch faithfully executes the
law. But case-by-case adjudication in a mass adjudication system
can undermine all of those goals when it leads to the selective
settlement of repeat claims, systemic barriers to legal access, or
bureaucratic obstacles to uniform relief.
Courts may be justified in developing new procedures in
other circumstances. But the idea that courts need room to experiment to review important and recurrent problems is consistent
with other doctrines that govern how courts review government
action. For similar reasons, courts have narrowly interpreted bars
on judicial review,330 allowed district courts to review issues collateral to statutes that channel cases from agencies into appellate
courts,331 and required “clear expression[s] of congressional
issues presented by individual, concrete cases coming up for resolution.” Quinault Allottee
Ass’n & Individual Allottees v. United States, 453 F.2d 1272, 1274–76 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Similarly, after eight years, rules governing habeas proceedings were amended to reflect the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), that habeas courts
could use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. GOVERNING § 2254 CASES IN
THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 12, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (stating that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure “may be applied to a proceeding under these rules”); FED. R. GOVERNING
§ 2255 CASES IN THE U.S. DIST. CTS. 12, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. § 2255 (same). Accordingly, many courts now certify habeas class actions under FED R. CIV. P. 23. See, e.g., Reid
v. Donelan, 297 F.R.D. 185, 188 n.2 (D. Mass. 2014).
329 Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 310, at 1250–51 (2012); William T. Mayton,
The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 103, 110 (1980); Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative
Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 496 (1970); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or
Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 930–42 (1965).
330 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 488–90 (1991).
331 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 209 n.11 (1994).
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intent” before finding that Congress has repealed procedural
tools, like class actions, to effectuate their judgments.332 The use
of novel procedural tools, like appellate class actions, is built on
the same rationale as these other judicial efforts: the need for a
guardrail against the careless closure of the courthouse doors.
CONCLUSION
Abstract debates about the role of judicial review in our politics cannot effectively take place without a discussion of the procedures that courts use to perform it. Even for important courts
that make binding decisions for large public institutions, individualized procedures can undermine their central role to hear
claims, interpret law, and provide relief to our most vulnerable.
In this way, appellate channeling statutes for public institutions share many of the same features—and raise many of the
same concerns—as mandatory arbitration provisions that ban
class actions against private institutions. Like arbitration, direct
appellate review promises more efficient, streamlined, and final
relief, sometimes by decisionmakers with expertise in a particular
field.333 But, without class actions, direct appellate review against
public institutions may also depress claims, limit the relevance of
precedent, and prevent parties from pooling resources they need
to obtain legal representation and more systemic relief.334
Unlike today’s modern arbitration jurisprudence, however,
courts should not lightly assume that Congress intended to eliminate aggregation techniques long used to address systemic government problems when it sends cases to appellate courts. Federal courts enjoy broad authority to manage the cases that come
before them as an independent, coequal branch of government.
And early experiments with class actions have helped appellate
judges protect their own jurisdiction to hear cases that would otherwise be frustrated by delay, poor recordkeeping, or maladministration. In this way, appellate class actions respect our
332

Califano, 442 U.S. at 699–701.
Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–52 (2011).
334 See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2812–13 (2015) (finding
fewer than thirty filed arbitration claims per year over five years for millions of AT&T
customers); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT& T v. Concepcion,
Wal–Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 133 (2011) (“[T]he providers [have] won the power to impose a mandatory, no-opt-out system in their own private
‘courts’’ designed to preclude aggregate litigation.”).
333

1484

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:1419

Constitutional design: ensuring courts continue to provide equal
justice under the law to both big institutions and “the smaller
guy.”335

335 Marvin Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST
L.J. 295, 299 (1966) (quoting Civil Rules Committee Reporter, Benjamin Kaplan) (concluding that the class action’s “historic mission [was] taking care of the smaller guy”).
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APPENDIX A:
(Federal Statutes Channeling Review Directly into
Appellate Courts)
Agency
Popular
Citation Description of OrigiName
Action
Re- nal
viewed
Provision
Date
Commodity Commod- 7 U.S.C. Suspensions
12/21/
Futures
ity Ex§ 7b
2000
Trading
change
Commission Act
Commodity Commod- 7 U.S.C. Denial, sus9/21/1
Futures
ity Ex§8
pension, or rev- 922
Trading
change
ocation of desCommission Act
ignation or
registration of
contract market or derivatives transaction execution
facility
Commodity Commod- 7 U.S.C. Orders denying 9/21/1
Futures
ity Ex§ 10a
designation or
922
Trading
change
registration as
Commission Act
contract market or a derivatives transaction
Commodity Commod- 7 U.S.C. Orders for
9/21/1
Futures
ity Ex§ 18
damages
922
Trading
change
against regisCommission Act
tered persons
Commodity Commod- 7 U.S.C. Orders of sanc- 9/21/1
Futures
ity Ex§ 21
tions
922
Trading
change
Commission Act
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Commodity Exchange
Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 27d

Rules and determinations
regarding regulation of hybrid instruments

12/21/
2000

Commodity Exchange
Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 12a

Orders related
to registration
of commodity
dealers

9/21/1
922

Packers
and
Stockyards Act
Federal
Seed Act

7 U.S.C. Orders regard§ 228b-3 ing live poultry
dealers

8/15/1
921

7 U.S.C.
§ 1600

Cease-anddesist orders

8/9/19
39

Department
of Agriculture

Animal
Welfare
Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 2149

4/22/1
976

Department
of Agriculture

Plant Variety Protection
Act
Agricultural Adjustment
Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 2461

Egg Research
and Consumer Information
Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 2714

Orders of violations of animal
auctioning licenses
Agency-protected plant
variety decisions
Civil penalties
for violating
plans for potato handlers
or importers
Civil penalties

Department
of Agriculture

Department
of Agriculture
Department
of Agriculture

7 U.S.C.
§ 2621

4/2/19
82
8/26/1
982

6/17/1
980
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Department
of Agriculture

Swine
Health
Protection Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 3804

Department
of Agriculture

Swine
Health
Protection Act
Agriculture and
Food Act
of 1981

7 U.S.C.
§ 3805
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Cease-and
desist orders
for failing to
operate a facility to treat garbage legally
Civil penalties

10/17/
1980

7 U.S.C.
§ 4314

Civil penalties

12/22/
1981

7 U.S.C.
§ 4610

Cease-anddesist orders

10/30/
1984

Department
of Agriculture

Honey
Research,
Promotion, and
Consumer
Information
Act
Food Security Act
of 1985

7 U.S.C.
§ 4815

Civil penalties
related to pork
orders

12/23/
1985

Department
of Agriculture

Food Security Act
of 1985

7 U.S.C.
§ 4910

12/23/
1985

Department
of Agriculture

Sheep
Promotion, Research,
and Information
Act of
1994

7 U.S.C.
§ 7107

Civil penalties
related to the
collection of assessments on
watermelons
Civil penalties
related to producers, feeders, importers,
handlers, and
purchasers of
sheep and
sheep products

Department
of Agriculture
Department
of Agriculture

10/17/
1980

10/22/
1994

1488

Department
of Agriculture

Department
of Agriculture
Department
of State

Department
of Justice
Department
of Justice
Department
of Justice
Department
of Justice
Department
of Justice
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Sheep
Promotion, Research,
and Information
Act of
1994
Packers
and
Stockyards Act
Immigration and
Nationality Act
Immigration and
Nationality Act
Immigration and
Nationality Act
Immigration and
Nationality Act
Immigration and
Nationality Act
Immigration and
Nationality Act

7 U.S.C.
§ 7419

Civil penalties
related to producers, handlers, and importers of an
agricultural
commodity

7 U.S.C.
§ 194
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4/4/19
96

Penalties under the Packers and Stockyards Act
8 U.S.C. Department of
§ 1189(c State designa)
tions of foreign
terrorist organization.
8 U.S.C. General orders
§ 1252(a of removal.
)(1)

8/28/1
958

8 U.S.C. Requirements
§ 1252(b for review of
)(1)-(5)
removal orders.
8 U.S.C. Requirements
§ 1252(b for review of
)(6)-(9)
removal orders.
8 U.S.C. Requirements
§ 1252(c for petition for
)
review of removal order.
8 U.S.C. Orders pertain§ 1252(e ing to inspec)
tion of applicants for
admission.

6/27/1
952

6/27/1
952

6/27/1
952

6/27/1
952
6/27/1
952
6/27/1
952
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Department
of Justice

Immigration and
Nationality Act

Department
of Justice

Immigration and
Nationality Act

Department
of Justice

Immigration and
Nationality Act
National
Housing
Act

Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development
Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development

National
Housing
Act

Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development

National
Housing
Act
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8 U.S.C. Civil monetary
§ 1324a( penalties and
e)(8)
other orders
for hiring and
related violations with regard to unauthorized aliens.
8 U.S.C. Orders pertain§ 1324b( ing to unfair
i)
immigrationrelated employment practices.
8 U.S.C. Orders pertain§ 1324c( ing to docud)(5)
ment fraud.

6/27/1
952

12
Civil monetary
U.S.C.
penalties as§ 1701q- sessed by the
1
agency relating
to supportive
housing for the
elderly
12
Agency imposiU.S.C.
tion of civil
§ 1735f- monetary pen14
alties for violations by Federal Housing
Act participants
12
HUD SecreU.S.C.
tary’s imposi§ 1735f- tion of civil
15
monetary penalties for violations by multifamily
mortgagors

9/23/1
959

6/27/1
952

6/27/1
952

6/27/1
934

6/27/1
934
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National
Credit Union Administration
Board

Federal
Credit
Union Act

12
U.S.C.
§ 1786

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Act

12
U.S.C.
§ 1817
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Agency’s orders to terminate, suspend,
cease-and-desist, or other
orders involving insured
credit unions
Agency’s disapproval of proposed acquisitions after
hearings
Review by parties “aggrieved
by orders” of
the Board

8/9/19
89

12
U.S.C.
§ 2266

Decisions by
Farm Credit
Administration

12/10/
1971

12
U.S.C.
§ 2268

Civil monetary
penalties entered after an
agency hearing
Foreign bank
applications rejected by the
Federal Reserve Board
Final orders by
the Director of
FHFA

12/10/
1971

Classifications
by the director

10/28/
1992

Board of
Governors
of the Federal Reserve System
Farm
Credit Administration
Farm
Credit Administration
Federal Reserve

12
U.S.C.
§ 1848

Federal
Housing Finance
Agency
Federal
Housing Finance
Agency

12
U.S.C.
§ 4583

12
U.S.C.
§ 3105

12
U.S.C.
§ 4623

9/21/1
950

7/1/19
66

9/17/1
978

10/28/
1992
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12
U.S.C.
§ 4634

Orders from
FHFA proceedings

10/28/
1992

DoddFrank
Wall
Street Reform and
Consumer
Protection Act
Clayton
Antitrust
Act of
1914

12
U.S.C.
§ 5563

Orders by the
CFPB

7/21/2
010

15
U.S.C.
§ 21

Cease-anddesist orders
under Clayton
Antitrust Act

10/15/
1914

Act to
Create
the Federal
Trade
Commission
MagnusonMoss
Warranty—
Federal
Trade

15
U.S.C.
§ 45

Orders to
cease-anddesist from using any method
of competition
or act or practice
Unfair or deceptive acts or
practices rulemaking proceedings

9/26/1
914

15
U.S.C.
§ 57a

9/26/1
914
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Commission Improvement Act
Small Business Administration

Small
Business
Investment Act
of 1958
Natural
Gas Act

15
U.S.C.
§ 687a

Federal
Energy
Administration
Act of
1974
Trademarks

15
U.S.C.
§ 766

Consumer
Product
Safety Commission

Flammable Fabrics Act

15
U.S.C.
§ 1193

Consumer
Product
Safety Commission

Federal
Hazardous Substances
Labeling
Act

15
U.S.C.
§ 1262

Consumer
Product
Safety Commission

Poison
Prevention Packaging Act
of 1970

15
U.S.C.
§ 1474

Department
of Energy
Department
of Energy

Trademark
Trial and
Appeal
Board

15
U.S.C.
§ 717r

15
U.S.C.
§ 1071

Cease-anddesist orders
for violation of
Small Business
Investment Act
Commission
orders under
Natural Gas
Act
Rulemaking
under Federal
Energy Administration Act

8/21/1
958

Board decisions on applications for registrations of
marks
Standards or
regulations under the Flammable Fabrics
Act
Determinations that a toy
presents an
electrical, mechanical, or
thermal hazard
Packaging
safety standards and regulations

10/9/1
962

6/21/1
938
5/7/19
74

6/30/1
953

7/12/1
960

12/30/
1970
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Housing
and Urban Development Act
of 1968
Horse
Protection Act
of 1970

15
U.S.C.
§ 1710

Orders under
the Housing
and Urban Development Act
of 1968

8/1/19
68

15
U.S.C.
§ 1825

7/13/1
976

Consumer
Product
Safety Commission
Environmental Protection
Agency

Consumer
Product
Safety
Act
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act

5 U.S.C.
§ 2060

Civil penalties
under the
Horse Protection Act of
1970
Consumer
product safety
rules

10/11/
1976

Environmental Protection
Agency

Toxic
Substances
Control
Act
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act
Toxic
Substances
Control
Act
Natural
Gas Policy Act

15
U.S.C.
§ 2617

Administrative
civil penalties
under the
Toxic Substances Control Act
Waiver requests under
the Toxic Substances Control Act
Orders under
the Toxic Substances Control Act

15
U.S.C.
§ 2622

Employee discharge or discrimination

10/11/
1976

15
U.S.C.
§ 3416

Orders under
the Natural
Gas Policy Act

11/9/1
978

Department
of Agriculture

Environmental Protection
Agency
Environmental Protection
Agency
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

15
U.S.C.
§ 2615

15
U.S.C.
§ 2618

10/27/
1972

10/11/
1976

6/22/2
016
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Commodity
Futures
Trading
Commission, Securities and
Exchange
Commission
Commodity
Futures
Trading
Commission, Securities and
Exchange
Commission
Department
of the Interior
Department
of Agriculture, Army,
Council of
Economic
Advisors,
Environmental
Protection
Agency, Department of
Interior,
and
National
Oceanic
and Atmopsheric
Administration
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DoddFrank
Wall
Street Reform and
Consumer
Protection Act
of 2010
DoddFrank
Wall
Street Reform and
Consumer
Protection Act
of 2010

15
U.S.C.
§ 8302

Commission’s
rulemaking
proceedings related to derivatives or similar
products

7/21/2
010

15
U.S.C.
§ 8306

7/21/2
010

Endangered
Species
Act
Amendments of
1978

16
U.S.C.
§ 1536

Final orders
with respect to
a novel derivative product
that may affect
the other Commission’s statutory jurisdiction
Decisions regarding federal
employees for
improvement
of lands
Exemptions
granted by the
Endangered
Species Committee (also
known as the
“God Squad”)

16
U.S.C.
§ 79l

3/27/1
978

12/28/
1973

2022]

The Class Appeal

Department
of Energy

16
U.S.C.
§ 824k(i
)

Department
of the Interior

Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Health
and Human
Services

Federal
Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic
Act
Federal
Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic
Act
Federal
Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic
Act
Federal
Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic
Act

Orders requiring the Administrator of the
Bonneville
Power Administration to
provide transmission service
16
Decisions by
U.S.C.
the Secretary
§ 160a-1 to revert land
from states to
the United
States
20
DeterminaU.S.C.
tions regarding
§ 7973
the nonsmoking policy for
children’s services
21
Violations reU.S.C.
lated to medi§ 333(f) cal devices
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1/3/19
83

1/8/20
02

11/28/
1990

21
U.S.C.
§ 333(g)

Direct-toconsumer advertising

9/27/2
007

21
U.S.C.
§ 335a

Review for people adversely
affected by
Secretary’s decision regarding debarment
Review for people adversely
affected by
Secretary’s decision

5/13/1
992

21
U.S.C.
§ 335b

5/13/1
992
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regarding certain civil penalties
Department
of Health
and Human
Services

Federal
Food,
Drug, and
Cosmetic
Act

21
U.S.C.
§ 335c

Department
of Agriculture

Poultry
Products
Inspection Act

21
U.S.C.
§ 457(d)

Department
of Agriculture

Poultry
Products
Inspection Act

21
U.S.C.
§ 467(c)

Department
of Agriculture

Meat In21
spection
U.S.C.
Act/Whole § 607(e)
some
Meat Act

Department
of Agriculture

Egg Products Inspection
Act

21
U.S.C.
§ 1036

Department
of Agriculture

Egg Products Inspection
Act

21
U.S.C.
§ 1047

Review for people adversely
affected by
Secretary’s decision to withdraw approval
of abbreviated
drug applications
Secretary’s determinations
that markings,
containers and
labeling are
misleading
Secretary’s order with respect to withdrawal or
refusal of inspection service
Secretary’s determinations
that markings,
containers and
labeling are
misleading
Secretary’s determination regarding misleading
labeling or containers
Secretary’s determination to
refuse to provide or

5/13/1
992

8/18/1
968

8/28/1
957

12/15/
1967

12/29/
1979

12/29/
1979
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withdraw inspection service.
Federal
Elections
Commission

National
Labor
Relations
Board

Department
of Labor

Department
of Labor,
Mine Safety
and Health
Administration
Department
of Labor,
Mine Safety
and Health
Administration

Presidential Primary
Matching
Payment
Account
Act
National
Labor
Relations
Act

26
U.S.C.
§ 9041

Federal Elections Commission actions

10/15/
1974

29
U.S.C.
§ 160

7/5/19
35

Occupational
Safety
and
Health
Act of
1970
Mine
Safety
and
Health
Act of
1977
Mine
Safety
and
Health
Act of
1977

29
U.S.C.
§ 655

Orders of
National Labor
Relations
Board remediating
unfair labor
practices
by employer or
union
Health and
Secretary of
Labor safety
rules

Any rules governing substantive mine
health or
safety requirements
Secretary’s inclusion or failure to approve
state worker’s
compensation
law on a list
for laws that
are deemed to

12/30/
1969

30
U.S.C.
§ 811

30
U.S.C.
§ 931

12/29/
1970

12/30/
1969
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Department
of Labor,
Mine Safety
and Health
Administration

Mine
Safety
and
Health
Act of
1977

Department
of Labor;
Occupational
Safety and
Health Administration
Department
of Labor;
Occupational
Safety and
Health Administration
Department
of Labor;
Occupational
Safety and
Health Administration
Department
of Labor;
Occupational
Safety and
Health Administration

Moving
Ahead for
Progress
in the
21st Century Act

provide adequate coverage
30
Secretary’s deU.S.C.
cisions on
§ 953
whether to provide funding
related to state
mining programs
49
WrongfulU.S.C.
discharge
§ 30171( claims by emb)(4)
ployees providing motor-vehicle safety
information
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12/30/
1969

7/6/20
12

Surface
Transportation Assistance
Act of
1982

49
Improper disU.S.C.
charge, disci§ 31105( pline, or disd)
crimination
against employees

6/6/19
83

Aircraft
Safety
Act of
2000

49
Wrongful-disU.S.C.
charge claims
§ 42121( by employees
b)(4)
providing air
safety information

4/5/20
00

Pipeline
Safety
Improvement Act
of 2002

49
Wrongful-disU.S.C.
charge claims
§ 60129( by employees
b)(4)
providing pipeline safety information

12/17/
2002
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Department
of Labor

Safe
Drinking
Water Act

42
U.S.C.
§ 300j-9

Department
of Labor

Black
Lung
Benefits
Act of
1973
Clean Air
Act

33
U.S.C.
§ 921

Longshore and
Harbor
Workers’
Compensation Act
PACEEnergy
Act

33
U.S.C.
§ 907(j)

Department
of Labor

Department
of Labor

Department
of Labor,
Department
of Energy

42
U.S.C.
§ 7622(c
)

42
U.S.C.
§ 5851(c
)

1499

Secretary’s order in response
to discrimination complaint
filed by an employee
Orders regarding black lung
benefits

11/8/1
994

Department of
Labor orders
regarding employee discrimination and
wrongful discharge relating
to the Clean
Air Act
Secretary of
Labor’s decisions regarding
health-care
services

8/7/19
77

Secretary of
Labor’s determinations on
employee discrimination for
certain licensees, applicants at the
Dep’t of Energy

11/6/1
978

10/27/
1973

9/28/1
984

1500
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Department
of Labor

Federal
Mine Safety
and Health
Review
Commission

Mine
Safety
and
Health
Act of
1977

GAO Personnel Appeals Board

Title 31

Department
of the
Treasury

Anti-Corruption
Act of
1993
Clean
Water Act

Environmental Protection
Agency

[89:1419

49
Secretary of
U.S.C.
Labor’s resolu§ 20109( tion of labor
d)-(f)
complaints by
railroad employees about
employer’s discharge, discipline, discrimination, and
other violations of railroad employee
protections
30
Orders issued
U.S.C.
by the Com§ 816
mission regarding wrongful discharge of
mining employees for retaliation for
whistleblowing
complaints.
31
Final decisions
U.S.C.
of personnel
§ 755
corrective or
disciplinary actions
31
Suspension of
U.S.C.
federal pay§ 6717
ments to states

7/5/19
94

33
U.S.C.
§ 1369

10/18/
1972

Rules and orders by agency
about water
pollution prevention and
control.

12/30/
1969

9/13/1
982

9/13/1
994
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Department
of Transportation
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1501

Deepwater
Port Act
of 1974,
Maritime
Transportation Security Act
of 2002
Saint
Lawrence
Seaway
Act

33
U.S.C.
§ 1516

Secretary of
Transportation’s licensing
decisions

1/3/19
75

33
U.S.C.
§ 988(a)

Agency orders

5/13/1
954

Patents

35
U.S.C.
§ 141

7/19/1
952

Department
of Veterans
Affairs,
Board of
Veterans’
Appeals

Veterans’
Benefits

38
U.S.C.
§ 7252

Department
of Veterans
Affairs

Veterans’
Benefits

38
U.S.C.
§ 7292

Department
of Veterans
Affairs

Veterans’
Benefits

38
U.S.C.
§ 502

Examinations,
re-examinations, postgrant decisions, interpartes review,
and deprivation proceedings
Final decisions
of the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals by the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Decisions of
the Court of
Appeals for
Veterans
Claims by the
Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit
Rules and regulations

The Saint
Lawrence
Seaway Development
Corporation
U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office

11/18/
1988

11/18/
1988

8/6/19
91

1502
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Department
of Veterans
Affairs

Veterans’
Benefits

Department
of Veterans
Affairs

Veterans’
Benefits

Merit Systems Protection
Board
Postal Regulatory
Commission

Veterans’
Benefits
Postal
Service
Act

38
U.S.C.
§ 7263(c
)–(d)
38
U.S.C.
§ 7422(e
)
38
U.S.C.
§ 4324(d
)
39
U.S.C.
§ 3663

U.S. Postal
Service

Postal
Service
Act

39
U.S.C.
§ 3691

Department
of Health
and Human
Services

Clinical
Laboratory Improvement
Amendments of
1988
Mammography
Quality
Standards Act
of 1992
Hospital
and Medical Facilities

42
U.S.C.
§ 263a(
k)

Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Health
and Human
Services

[89:1419

Fee agreements

11/18/
1988

Regulations relating to collective bargaining

5/7/19
91

Decisions by
Merit Systems
Protection
Board
Final orders or
decisions of the
Postal Regulatory Commission
Regulations
about service
standards for
marketdominant products
Sanctions imposed on laboratories

10/13/
1994

42
U.S.C.
§ 263b(
k)

Sanctions imposed on mammography facilities

10/9/1
992

42
U.S.C.
§ 291h

Surgeon General’s refusal to
approve an application for a
grant or loan

8/18/1
964

12/20/
2006

12/20/
2006

12/5/1
967
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1503

Amendments of
1964
Environmental Protection
Agency
Environmental Protection
Agency
Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Social Security Administration,
Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Commerce, U.S.
Patent and
Trademark
Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission, Department of
Energy

Safe
Drinking
Water Act
Amendments of
1996
Safe
Drinking
Water Act

PriceAnderson
Amendments Act
of 1988
(amending the
Atomic

42
U.S.C.
§ 300g1(b)(6)
42
U.S.C.
§ 300j-7

Agency’s decision whether to
comply with
the maximum
contaminant
level
Drinking-water
regulations

6/19/1
986

6/19/1
986

42
Civil penalties
U.S.C.
levied by the
§ 1320a- Secretary
7a(e)
42
Civil penalties
U.S.C.
levied by the
§ 1320a- Commissioner
8(d)
of Social Security.

12/14/
1999

42
U.S.C.
§ 2182

8/1/19
46

Patent Trial
and Appeal
Board’s decisions on atomic
inventions

42
Findings and
U.S.C.
penalties
§ 2282a(
c)

12/14/
1999

8/20/1
988

1504
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Energy
Act of
1954)
Department
of Health
and Human
Services
Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development

Housing
and Urban Development Act

Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development

Housing
and Urban Development Act

Environmental Protection
Agency

Quiet
Communities Act
of 1978

Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development

Tornado
Shelters
Act

Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development

Manufactured
Housing
and Improvement Act
Alternative Motor Fuels

Department
of Energy

42
Secretary’s disU.S.C.
proval of plans
§ 3027(c for state pro), (e)
grams on aging
42
Penalties
U.S.C.
against ad§ 3537a( vanced discloc)
sure of funding
decisions by
the secretary
42
Secretary’s deU.S.C.
termination
§ 3545(
that funding
h)
application disclosure requirements
have been violated
42
Administrator
U.S.C.
noise control
§ 4915
decisions

10/18/
1978

42
U.S.C.
§ 5311(c
)

Termination,
limitation, or
reduction of
community development
funds by the
secretary
42
Agency orders
U.S.C.
establishing
§ 5405(a home and
)
safety standards

8/22/1
974

42
U.S.C.

12/22/
1975

Energy conservation standards by the

12/15/
1989

12/15/
1989

10/27/
1972

8/22/1
974
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Department
of Energy

Department
of Energy

Department
of Housing
and Urban
Development, Department of
Labor, Occupational
Safety and
Health Administration
Environmental Protection
Agency
Environmental Protection
Agency
Environmental Protection
Agency
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Act of
1988
Alternative Motor Fuels
Act of
1988
Energy
Conservation and
Production Act
Resource
Conservation and
Recovery
Act

Resource
Conservation and
Recovery
Act
Clean Air
Act

Clean Air
Act

§ 6303
secretary of
(d)
Energy
42
Rules relating
U.S.C.
to energy con§ 6306(b servation
)
standards
42
U.S.C.
§ 6869

1505

12/22/
1975

Decisions by
the Secretary
of Energy for
low-income applications for
weatherization
assistance
42
Secretary of
U.S.C.
Labor’s orders
§ 6971(b to abate em)
ployee discrimination in
waste services

8/14/1
976

42
U.S.C
§ 6976

Disposal regulations

10/21/
1976

42
U.S.C.
§ 7412
(e)(3),
(4)
42
U.S.C.
§ 7421

Administrator’s emissions
standards

11/15/
1990

Implementation plans for
carrying out
the Clean Air
Act’s requirements for local

11/15/
1990

10/21/
1976

1506
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Environmental Protection
Agency

Clean Air
Act

42
U.S.C.
§ 7525(b
)(2)(ii)(B
)

Environmental Protection
Agency

Clean Air
Act

42
U.S.C.
§ 7607(b
), (e)

Environmental Protection
Agency

Clean Air
Act

42
U.S.C.
§ 7661d(
b)(2)

Department
of Energy

Uranium
Mill Tailings Radiation
Control
Act of
1978

42
U.S.C.
§ 7920(a
)(2)

Department
of Energy

Powerplant and
Industrial
Fuel Use
Act of
1978

42
U.S.C.
§ 8412(c
)

governments,
regional agencies, and councils
Suspensions or
revocations of
certificates of
conformity for
automobile engines
Air quality,
emissions, and
other requirements and determinations
Agency denials
of pollution
permits such
petitions are
judicially reviewable
Secretary of
Energy’s assessment of a
civil penalty
for violation of
certain radiation control
regulations
Agency prohibition of particular energy
sources or
granting and
decisions on
petition for exemption
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11/15/
1990

11/15/
1990

11/15/
1990

11/8/1
978

11/9/1
978
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Department
of Energy

Power
Plant and
Industrial
Fuel Use
Act of
1978

42
U.S.C.
§ 8433(d
)(2)(B)

Penalties for
exceeding fuel
use levels approved by the
Secretary of
Energy

11/9/1
978

National
Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration
Environmental Protection
Agency

Ocean
Thermal
Energy
Conversion Act
of 1980
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation,
and Liability Act
of 1980
Nuclear
Waste
Policy Act
of 1982

42
U.S.C.
§ 9125

Orders to
transfer, modify, renew, suspend, or terminate licenses

8/3/19
80

42
U.S.C.
§ 9613

Regulations
12/11/
promulgated
1980
under the
Comprehensive
Response Compensation and
Liability Act

42
U.S.C.
§ 10139

Decisions related to radioactive and nuclear fuel
repositories

1/7/19
83

Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of
Rights
Act of
2000

42
U.S.C.
§ 15028

State developmental disability plan approval

10/30/
2000

Department
of Energy,
Environmental Protection
Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Department
of Health
and Human
Services

1508

Railroad
Retirement
Board

The University of Chicago Law Review
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45
U.S.C.
§ 355(f)

Benefit decisions for railroad employees

6/25/1
938

Railroad
Retirement
Board

Railroad
Unemployment
Insurance
Act
Railroad
Retirement Act

45
U.S.C.
§231g

8/16/1
974

Federal
Maritime
Commission

Death on
the High
Seas Act

46
U.S.C.
§ 42307

Federal
Communications
Commission
National
Telecommunications
and Information Administration

Communications
Act of
1934
Middle
Class Tax
Relief and
Job Creation Act
of 2012

47
U.S.C.
§ 402

Benefit decisions under the
Railroad Retirement Act
with the same
review as under the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act
Commission
regulations
and final orders regarding
foreign shipping practices
Commission’s
orders and decisions generally
Dispute resolution board’s decisions regarding disputes
between federal and nonfederal entities
over execution,
timing, and
cost of transition plans
Penalties for
violations relating to commercial motorvehicle safety

Department
of Transportation

47
U.S.C.
§ 923(i)(
7)

49
U.S.C.
§ 521(b)
(9)

10/6/2
006

6/19/1
934
2/22/2
012

1/12/1
983
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1509

regulations
and operators

National
Transportation Safety
Board
National
Transportation Safety
Board
National
Transportation Safety
Board

Department
of Transportation;
Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration

Department
of Transportation

ICC Termination
Act of
1995

49
Final orders
U.S.C.
relating to avi§ 1153(a ation matters
)-(b)
by persons
with substantial interest
49
Final orders
U.S.C.
relating to avi§ 1153(a ation matters
), (c)
by FAA Administrator
49
Final orders
U.S.C.
relating to
§ 1153(a maritime mat), (d)
ters by the
Commandant
of the Coast
Guard
49
Transportation
U.S.C.
Secretary’s or§ 13907 ders related to
complaints and
investigations
about household goods
transportation
services under
authority of a
motor carrier
49
Transportation
U.S.C.
Secretary’s fi§ 20114( nal actions rec)
lated to railroad safety

7/5/19
94

7/5/19
94

7/5/19
94

12/29/
1995

7/5/19
94

1510

Department
of Transportation

Department
of Transportation

Department
of Transportation;
Environmental Protection
Agency

Department
of Transportation;
Federal
Trade Commission

The University of Chicago Law Review

Fixing
America’s
Surface
Transportation Act

49
Transportation
U.S.C.
Secretary’s dis§ 30172( cretionary
h)
awards and decisions related
to whistleblower incentives and protections
relating to motor-vehicle
safety
49
Transportation
U.S.C.
Secretary’s de§ 31141( cisions related
f)
to preemption
of state laws
and regulations
49
Regulations isU.S.C.
sued by De§ 32909 partment of
Transportation
or Environmental Protection Agency related to
automobile fuel
economy
49
Transportation
U.S.C.
Secretary and
§ 32915 Federal Trade
Commission
decisions involving civil
penalties for
automobile
fuel-economy
violations
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12/4/2
015

7/5/19
94

7/5/19
94

7/5/19
94
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Department
of Transportation;
Federal Aviation Administration;
Transportation Security Administration
Department
of Transportation

Department
of Transportation
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1511

Federal
Aviation
Act

49
U.S.C.
§ 46110

“[S]ecurity duties” carried
out by agencies
(including,
most recently,
“no fly list” orders).

7/5/19
94

Airport
and Airway Improvement Act

49
Improvement
U.S.C.
project grant
§ 47106( application apc)(3)
proval conditioned on satisfaction of
project requirements
49
Airport imU.S.C.
provement pro§ 47111( ject grant
b)(3)
agreements

9/3/19
82

49
Disputes conU.S.C.
cerning airport
§ 47129( fees
c)(5)-(6)

7/5/19
94

49
U.S.C.
§ 60119(
a)

Pipeline safety
regulations or
orders

8/12/1
968

49
Financial reU.S.C.
sponsibility or§ 60119( ders
b)

8/12/1
968

Airport
and Airway Improvement Act
Department Airport
of Transand Airportation
way Improvement Act
Department Natural
of TransGas Pipeportation;
line
Pipeline
Safety
and Hazard- Act of
ous Materi- 1968
als Safety
Administration
Department Natural
of TransGas Pipeportation;
line
Pipeline
Safety

9/3/19
82

1512

and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration
Department
of Transportation;
Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration

Department
of Transportation;
National
Highway
Transportation Safety
Administration
Department
of Transportation;
National
Highway
Transportation Safety
Administration
Department
of Transportation;
Environmental Protection
Agency

The University of Chicago Law Review
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Act of
1968

Hazardous Materials
Transportation
Safety
and
Safety
Reauthorization
Act of
2005
National
Traffic
Motor Vehicle
Safety
Act of
1966

49
U.S.C.
§ 5127

Actions relating to transportation of
hazardous materials

8/10/2
005

49
U.S.C.
§ 30161

Motor-vehicle
safety standards

9/9/19
66

Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost
Savings
Act

49
U.S.C.
§ 32503

Bumper standards

10/20/
1972

Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost
Savings
Act

49
U.S.C.
§ 32909

Automobilefuel-economy
regulations

10/20/
1972
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Securities
and Exchange
Commission
Securities
and Exchange
Commission
Securities
and Exchange
Commission

Securities
and Exchange
Commission
Securities
and Exchange
Commission
Securities
and Exchange
Commission
Securities
and Exchange
Commission

The Class Appeal

1513

Securities
Act of
1933

15
U.S.C.
§ 77i

Final Commission orders

5/27/1
933

Securities
Exchange
Act of
1934
DoddFrank
Wall
Street Reform and
Consumer
Protection Act
of 2010
Securities
Exchange
Act of
1934

15
U.S.C.
§ 78o(j)(
5)
15
U.S.C.
§ 78u6(f)

Final regulations related to
hybrid products
Whistleblower
determinations

6/6/19
34

Final Commission orders under the Securities Exchange
Act
15
Commission
U.S.C.
rules under the
§ 78y(b) Securities Exchange Act
15
Commission
U.S.C.
orders under
§ 80a-42 the Investment
Company Act

6/4/19
75

15
Commission
U.S.C.
orders under
§ 80b-13 the Investment
Advisers Act

8/22/1
940

Securities
Exchange
Act of
1934
Investment
Company
Act of
1940
Investment Advisers Act
of 1940

15
U.S.C.
§ 78y(a)

6/6/19
34

6/4/19
75
8/28/1
958

